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Abstract. We provide a security analysis for full-state keyed Sponge and full-state Duplex
constructions. Our results can be used for making a large class of Sponge-based authenticated
encryption schemes more efficient by concurrent absorption of associated data and message
blocks. In particular, we introduce and analyze a new variant of SpongeWrap with almost free
authentication of associated data. The idea of using full-state message absorption for higher
efficiency was first made explicit in the Donkey Sponge MAC construction, but without any
formal security proof. Recently, Gaži, Pietrzak and Tessaro (CRYPTO 2015) have provided
a proof for the fixed-output-length variant of Donkey Sponge. Yasuda and Sasaki (CT-RSA
2015) have considered partially full-state Sponge-based authenticated encryption schemes
for efficient incorporation of associated data. In this work, we unify, simplify, and generalize
these results about the security and applicability of full-state keyed Sponge and Duplex
constructions; in particular, for designing more efficient authenticated encryption schemes.
Compared to the proof of Gaži et al., our analysis directly targets the original Donkey Sponge
construction as an arbitrary-output-length function. Our treatment is also more general than
that of Yasuda and Sasaki, while yielding a more efficient authenticated encryption mode
for the case that associated data might be longer than messages.
Keywords: Sponge construction, Duplex construction, full-state absorption, authenticated
encryption, associated data.
1 Introduction
Since its introduction, the Sponge construction by Bertoni, Daemen, Peeters and Van Assche [4]
has faced an immense increase in popularity. As “simple” hash function mode, it is the fundament
of the SHA-3 standard Keccak [5], but also its keyed variants have become very popular modes
of operation for a permutation to build a wide spectrum of symmetric-key primitives: reseedable
pseudorandom number generators [7], pseudorandom functions and message authentication codes
(PRFs/MACs) [9,11], Extendable-Output Functions (“XOFs”) [24] and authenticated encryption
(AE) modes [10,11]. The keyed Sponge principle also got adopted in Spritz, a new RC4-like stream
cipher [26], and in 10 out of 57 submissions to the currently running CAESAR competition on
authenticated encryption [1,3]. These use cases reinforce the fact that Sponge-based constructions
will continue to play an important role, not only in the new hashing standard SHA-3, but in
various next-generation cryptographic algorithms.
The classical Sponge construction consists of a sequential application of a permutation 𝑝 on a
state of 𝑏 bits. This state is partitioned into an 𝑟-bit rate or outer part and a 𝑐-bit capacity or inner
part, where 𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝑐. In the absorption phase, message blocks of size 𝑟 bits are absorbed by the
outer part and the state is transformed using 𝑝, while in the squeezing phase, digests are extracted
from the outer part 𝑟 bits at a time. In the indifferentiability framework of Maurer, Renner and
Holenstein [20], Bertoni et al. [6] proved that the Sponge construction is secure up to the 𝑂(2𝑐/2)
birthday-type bound. The capacity part is left untouched throughout the evaluation of the Sponge
construction: a violation of this paradigm would make the indifferentiability security result void.
In this work, we strive for optimality, and investigate the most efficient ways of using Sponges
for message authentication and authenticated encryption in a provably secure manner. In both
directions, we consider a generalization of the currently known schemes to full-state absorption,
the most efficient usage of the underlying permutation, and we show that these schemes are secure.
Due to the full-state absorption, we cannot anymore rely on the classical indifferentiability result
of the Sponge (as was for instance done in [2,10]), and a new security analysis is required. We will
elaborate on both directions in the following.
Message Authentication. Bertoni et al. [9] introduced the keyed Sponge as a simple evaluation
of the Sponge function on the key and the message, Sponge(𝐾‖𝑀), and proved security beyond
𝑂(2𝑐/2). Chang et al. considered a slight variant of the keyed Sponge where the key is processed
in the inner part of the Sponge, and observed that it can be seen as the Sponge based on an Even-
Mansour blockcipher. At FSE 2015, Andreeva, Daemen, Mennink and Van Assche [2] considered
a generic and improved analysis of both the outer- and inner-keyed Sponge. So far, however, these
constructions have only been considered with the classical 𝑟-bit absorption.
The idea of using full-state message absorption for achieving higher efficiency was first made
explicit in the Donkey Sponge MAC construction [11],3 but without any formal security proof.
The recently introduced Donkey-inspired MAC function Chaskey [22] did get a formal security
analysis, but its proof is thwarted towards Chaskey and does not apply to the Donkey Sponge.
A thorough analysis of the full-state message absorption keyed Sponge had to wait for Gaži,
Pietrzak and Tessaro [17], who prove nearly tight security up to 𝑂(ℓ𝑞(𝑞+𝑁)/2𝑏+𝑞(𝑞+ℓ+𝑁)/2𝑐),
where the adversary makes 𝑞 queries of maximal length ℓ, and makes 𝑁 primitive calls. However,
their analysis only applies to the fixed-output-length variant, and the proof does not directly seem
to extend to the original arbitrary-output-length keyed Sponge. In this work, we provide a direct
proof for this more general case.
In more detail, we present a generalized scheme, dubbed Full-state Keyed Sponge (FKS), whose
security implies the security of Donkey Sponge in the ideal permutation setting, and prove that it is
secure up to approximately 2(𝑞ℓ)
2
2𝑏 +
2𝑞2ℓ
2𝑐 +
𝜇𝑁
2𝑘 , where 𝑘 is the size of the key, and 𝜇 is a parameter
called the “multiplicity”. We note that usage of the outer-keyed Sponge makes no longer any
difference from the usage of the inner-keyed variant in the presence of full-state absorption (see
also Sect. 8). Our proof of FKS follows the modular approach of Andreeva et al., but due to the
full-state absorption, we cannot rely on the indifferentiability result of [6], and present a new and
more detailed analysis.
Authenticated Encryption. Encryption via the Sponge can be done (and is typically done)
via the Duplex construction [10], a stateful construction consisting of an initialization interface
and a duplexing interface. The initialization interface can be called to initialize an all-zero state;
the duplexing interface absorbs a message of size < 𝑟 bits and squeezes ≤ 𝑟 bits of the outer part.
The security of the Duplex traces back to the indifferentiability of the classical Sponge, yielding a
𝑂(2𝑐/2) security bound.
Bertoni et al. [10] showed that the Duplex, in turn, allows for authenticated encryption in the
form of SpongeWrap. This mode is, de facto, the basis of the majority of Sponge-based submissions
to the CAESAR competition. Jovanovic et al. [18] re-investigated Sponge-based authenticated en-
cryption schemes, starring NORX, and derived beyond birthday-bound security. These results are,
however, all for the usual 𝑟-bit absorption. Yasuda and Sasaki [27] have considered several full-state
and partially full-state Sponge-based authenticated encryption schemes for efficient incorporation
of associated data, directly lifting Jovanovic et al.’s security proofs. The concurrent absorption
mode proposed by Yasuda and Sasaki (Fig. 3 in [27]) fails to utilize the full-state absorption when
the associated data becomes longer than the message, forcing the mode switch from a full-state
mode to the classical 𝑟-bit absorbing Sponge mode; hence, we refer to this as a partially full-state
AE mode. Full-state data absorption was also proposed by Reyhanitabar, Vaudenay and Vizár [25]
in their compression function based AE mode p-OMD.
We generically aim to optimize the efficiency in Sponge-based authenticated encryption. To
this end, we first formalize the Full-state Keyed Duplex (FKD) construction. It differs from the
3 We note that apart from full-state absorption, the Donkey Sponge also uses less rounds in the underlying
permutation during the absorbing phase.
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original Duplex in the fact that (i) the key is explicitly used to initialize the state (In this, the
FKD is similar to the Monkey Duplex [11]) and (ii) the absorption is performed on the entire state.
Note that the possibility to absorb in the entire state enforces the explicit usage of the key. Next,
we prove that FKD is provably secure, i.e., indistinguishable from a random oracle with the same
interfaces. As before, we cannot rely on the classical indifferentiability proof due to the full-state
absorption; however, we show how to adapt the FKS proof to a special case directly related to the
security of FKD.
We exemplify the better absorption capabilities of FKD by the introduction of a Full-state
SpongeWrap (FSW). The FSW construction is more general than that of Yasuda and Sasaki,
who only considered specific AE constructions, and interestingly, our approach also yields a more
efficient (truly full-state) authenticated encryption mode irrespective of the relative lengths of
messages and their associated data.
Organization of the Paper. Notations and preliminary concepts are presented in Sect. 2. We
present the Full-state Keyed Sponge and Full-state Keyed Duplex in Sect. 3. The security model is
discussed in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5 we prove security of FKS and in Sect. 6 of FKD. The introduction
of the Full-state SpongeWrap, and the application of FKD to this construction is given in Sect. 7.
Sect. 8 provides a brief discussion on related-key security and our security models.
2 Notations and Conventions
The set of all strings of length 𝑏 is denoted as {0, 1}𝑏 for any 𝑏 ≥ 1 and the set of all finite strings
of arbitrary length is denoted as {0, 1}*. We will denote the empty string of length 0 as 𝜀. For any
positive 𝑏, we let {0, 1}<𝑏 = ⋃︀𝑏−1𝑖=0{0, 1}𝑖 denote set of all strings of length less than 𝑏 including 𝜀.
For two strings 𝑋,𝑌 ∈ {0, 1}* we let 𝑋 ‖𝑌 denote the string obtained by concatenation of 𝑋 and
𝑌 . For a string 𝑋 ∈ {0, 1}𝑥 we let leftℓ (𝑋) denote the ℓ leftmost bits of 𝑋 and right𝑟 (𝑋) the 𝑟
rightmost bits of 𝑋 such that 𝑋 = left𝜒 (𝑋) ‖ right𝑥−𝜒 (𝑋) for any 0 ≤ 𝜒 ≤ 𝑥. For integral 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑐
such that 𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝑐, and for 𝑡 ∈ {0, 1}𝑏, we let outer (𝑡) = left𝑟 (𝑡) and inner (𝑡) = right𝑐 (𝑡).
For a non-empty finite set 𝒮 let 𝑎 $←− 𝒮 denote sampling an element 𝑎 from 𝒮 uniformly at
random. We let |𝑍| denote the cardinality if 𝑍 is a set and the length if 𝑍 is a string. We let
Perm (𝑏) denote the set of all permutations of 𝑏-bit strings and Func (𝑏) the set of all functions
over 𝑏-bit strings.
Given two strings 𝑋,𝑌 , let
llcp𝑏 (𝑋,𝑌 ) = max
𝑖≥0
{𝑖 : left𝑖𝑏 (𝑋) = left𝑖𝑏 (𝑌 )}
denote the length of the longest common prefix between 𝑋 and 𝑌 in 𝑏-bit blocks. For a string 𝑋
and a non-empty set of strings {𝑌1, . . . , 𝑌𝑛} let
llcp𝑏 (𝑋;𝑌1, . . . , 𝑌𝑛) = max {llcp𝑏 (𝑋,𝑌1) , . . . , llcp𝑏 (𝑋,𝑌𝑛)} .
For any two pairs of integers (𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖′, 𝑗′), we say that (𝑖′, 𝑗′) < (𝑖, 𝑗) if either 𝑖′ < 𝑖 or if 𝑖′ = 𝑖
and 𝑗′ < 𝑗. We say that (𝑖′, 𝑗′) ≤ (𝑖, 𝑗) if (𝑖′, 𝑗′) < (𝑖, 𝑗) or if (𝑖′, 𝑗′) = (𝑖, 𝑗). In other words, we use
lexicographical ordering to determine ordering of integer-tuples.
3 Sponge Constructions
3.1 Full-State Keyed Sponge
We consider the Full-state Keyed Sponge (FKS) construction that is using a public permutation
𝑝 : {0, 1}𝑏 → {0, 1}𝑏. It is furthermore parameterized with 𝑟, 𝑘, which are required to satisfy 𝑟 < 𝑏
and 𝑘 ≤ 𝑏− 𝑟 =: 𝑐. The parametrization is sometimes left implicit if it is clear from the context.
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Fig. 1: The FKS construction.
FKS gets as input a key 𝐾 ∈ {0, 1}𝑘, a message 𝑀 ∈ {0, 1}*, and a natural number 𝑧, and it
outputs a string 𝑍 ∈ {0, 1}𝑧:
FKS𝑝(𝐾,𝑀, 𝑧) = FKS𝑝𝐾(𝑀, 𝑧) = 𝑍 .
It operates on a state 𝑡 ∈ {0, 1}𝑏, which is initialized using the key 𝐾. The message 𝑀 is first
padded to a length a multiple of 𝑏 bits, using pad𝑏(𝑀) = 𝑀‖10𝑏−1−|𝑀 | mod 𝑏, which is then
viewed as 𝑚 𝑏-bit message blocks 𝑀1‖...‖𝑀𝑚.4 These message blocks are processed one-by-one,
interleaved with evaluations of 𝑝. After the absorption of 𝑀 , the outer 𝑟 bits of the state are
output and the state is processed via 𝑝 until a sufficient amount of output bits are obtained. FKS
is depicted in Fig. 1, and Algo. 1 provides a formal specification of FKS.
Algorithm 1 FKS[𝑝, 𝑟, 𝑘](𝐾,𝑀, 𝑧)
1: 𝑡← 0𝑏−𝑘 ‖𝐾
2: 𝑀1 ‖ · · · ‖𝑀𝑚 𝑏←− pad𝑏(𝑀)
3: for 𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑚 do
4: 𝑠← 𝑡⊕𝑀 𝑖
5: 𝑡← 𝑝(𝑠)
6: 𝑍 ← left𝑟 (𝑡)
7: while |𝑍| < 𝑧 do
8: 𝑡← 𝑝(𝑡)
9: 𝑍 ← 𝑍 ‖ left𝑟 (𝑡)
10: return left𝑧 (𝑍)
Algorithm 2 FKD[𝑝, 𝑟, 𝑘]
1: Interface FKD.initialize(𝐾)
2: 𝑡← 0𝑏−𝑘 ‖𝐾
1: Interface FKD.duplexing(𝑀, 𝑧)
2: if 𝑧 > 𝑟 or |𝑀 | ≥ 𝑏 then
3: return ⊥
4: 𝑠← 𝑡⊕ pad𝑏(𝑀)
5: 𝑡← 𝑝(𝑠)
6: return left𝑧 (𝑡)
3.2 Full-State Keyed Duplex
We present the Full-state Keyed Duplex (FKD) construction, a generalization of the Duplex of
Bertoni et al. [8,10]. FKD is also parameterized by a public permutation 𝑝 : {0, 1}𝑏 → {0, 1}𝑏 and
values 𝑟, 𝑘, which are required to satisfy 𝑟 < 𝑏 and 𝑘 ≤ 𝑏 − 𝑟 =: 𝑐. Again, the parametrization
is sometimes left implicit if clear from the context. An instance of FKD, denoted by 𝐷, consists
of two interfaces: 𝐷.initialize and 𝐷.duplexing. 𝐷.initialize gets as input a key 𝐾 ∈ {0, 1}𝑘 and
outputs nothing, while 𝐷.duplexing gets as input a message 𝑀 ∈ {0, 1}<𝑏 and a natural number
𝑧 ≤ 𝑟, and it outputs a string 𝑍 ∈ {0, 1}𝑧. FKD is depicted in Fig. 2, and the formal specification
is given in Algo. 2. FKD is a generalization of FKS where 𝐷.initialize is used to initialize the
state, and messages are absorbed into the state and/or digests are squeezed out of the state using
𝐷.duplexing calls.
4 In fact, any injective padding function works, as long as the last block is always non-zero.
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Fig. 2: The FKD construction.
4 Security Models and Tools
Multiplicity. Let {(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖)}𝜎𝑖=1 be a set of 𝜎 evaluations of a permutation 𝑝. Following Andreeva
et al. [2], we define the total maximal multiplicity as 𝜇 = 𝜇fwd + 𝜇bwd, where
𝜇fwd = max
𝑎
|{𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝜎} : outer (𝑥𝑖) = 𝑎}|,
𝜇bwd = max
𝑎
|{𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝜎} : outer (𝑦𝑖) = 𝑎}|.
The multiplicity is a quantity that characterises the data that are available to the adversary
during the attack. We have 2 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 2𝜎 per definition, however the upper bound 2𝜎 is never reached
in practical applications of sponge-based constructions. Being a sum of forward and backward
multiplicities, the total multiplicity can be seen as a measure of adversary’s ability to control the
outer part of the permutation inputs and outputs respectively. In case of sponge-based designs, the
backward multiplicity can be expected to be approximately 𝜎2−𝑟 while the forward multiplicity
varies with concrete applications [2].
4.1 Adversaries and Patarin’s Coefficient-H Technique
We consider an information-theoretic adversary 𝐴 that has access to one or more oracles 𝑋; this
is denoted by𝐴𝑋 and the notation 𝐴𝑋 ⇒ 1 means that 𝐴, after interaction with 𝑋, returns 1. It
is a classical fact (for a simple proof see [14]) that in the information-theoretic setting, adversaries
can be assumed to be deterministic without loss of generality.
We use Patarin’s Coefficient-H technique [23]; more precisely, a revisited formulation of it by
Chen and Steinberger [14]. Consider a deterministic information-theoretic adversary 𝐴 whose goal
is to distinguish two oracles 𝑋 and 𝑌 :
𝛥𝐴 (𝑋;𝑌 ) =
⃒⃒⃒
Pr
[︁
𝐴𝑋 ⇒ 1
]︁
− Pr
[︁
𝐴𝑌 ⇒ 1
]︁⃒⃒⃒
.
Here, 𝑋 and 𝑌 are randomized algorithms; the randomization depends on the specific scenario
and for now is left implicit. The interaction with any of the two systems 𝑋 or 𝑌 is summarized in
a transcript 𝜏 . Denote by 𝐷𝑋 the probability distribution of transcripts when interacting with 𝑋,
and similarly, 𝐷𝑌 the distribution of transcripts when interacting with 𝑌 . A transcript 𝜏 is called
attainable if Pr [𝐷𝑌 = 𝜏 ] > 0, meaning that it can occur during interaction with 𝑌 . Denote by 𝒯
the set of all attainable transcripts. The Coefficient-H technique states the following, for the proof
of which we refer to [14].
Lemma 1 (Coefficient-H Technique [14, 23]). Consider a fixed deterministic adversary 𝐴.
Let 𝒯 = 𝒯good ∪ 𝒯bad be a partition into good transcripts 𝒯good and bad transcripts 𝒯bad. If there
exists an 𝜀 such that for all 𝜏 ∈ 𝒯good,
Pr [𝐷𝑋 = 𝜏 ]
Pr [𝐷𝑌 = 𝜏 ]
≥ 1− 𝜀,
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then, 𝛥𝐴 (𝑋;𝑌 ) ≤ 𝜀+ Pr [𝐷𝑌 ∈ 𝒯bad].
The two partitions of 𝒯 are labeled as 𝒯good and 𝒯bad to aid the intuitiveness of the proof. The tran-
scripts in 𝒯good are “good” in the sense that they give us a high value of Pr [𝐷𝑋 = 𝜏 ]/Pr [𝐷𝑌 = 𝜏 ]
and thus small 𝜀 while the “bad” transcripts from 𝒯bad fail to do so.
4.2 Security Models for FKS and FKD
Let RO∞ : {0, 1}* → {0, 1}∞ be a random oracle which takes inputs of arbitrary but finite length
and returns random infinite strings, where each output bit is selected uniformly and independently
for every input 𝑀 .
Let 𝐹 be either FKS or FKD, which is based on a permutation 𝑝 : {0, 1}𝑏 → {0, 1}𝑏 and a
key 𝐾 ∈ {0, 1}𝑘. We will define the security of 𝐹 in two settings: the public permutation setting,
where the adversary has query access to the permutation (security comes from the secrecy of 𝐾),
and the secret permutation setting (with no explicit key 𝐾), where the adversary has no access
to the underlying permutation and the security comes from the secrecy of the permutation.
We use the notations 𝐹 𝑝𝐾 and 𝐹𝜋0 to refer to the public permutation and secret permutation
based schemes, respectively; where, 𝜋 is a secret random permutation.
In both settings, we consider an adversary that aims to distinguish the real 𝐹 from an ideal
(reference) primitive—an oracle RO with the same interface. For 𝐹 = FKS the corresponding ideal
primitive RO is defined by ROFKS(𝑀, 𝑧) = left𝑧 (RO∞(𝑀)). For 𝐹 = FKD the corresponding
reference primitive ROFKD is a stateful oracle with two interfaces: (1) RO𝑟FKD.initialize() that
initializes the state of the oracle, St, to the empty string, and (2) RO𝑟FKD.duplexing(𝑀, 𝑧) that,
on input 𝑀 ∈ {0, 1}<𝑏 and a natural number 𝑧, first updates the state as St ← St||𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑏(𝑀) and
then outputs left𝑧 (RO∞(St)).
We define the distinguishing advantage of any adversary 𝐴 against 𝐹 based on a public per-
mutation by
Advind𝐹𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝐴) =
⃒⃒⃒
Pr
[︁
𝐾
$←− {0, 1}𝑘, 𝑝 $←− Perm (𝑏) : 𝐴𝐹𝑝𝐾 ,𝑝,𝑝−1 ⇒ 1
]︁
−
Pr
[︁
𝑝
$←− Perm (𝑏) : 𝐴RO,𝑝,𝑝−1 ⇒ 1
]︁⃒⃒⃒
.
The distinguishing advantage of 𝐴 against 𝐹 based on a secret permutation is defined by
Advind𝐹𝜋0 (𝐴) =
⃒⃒⃒
Pr
[︁
𝜋
$←− Perm (𝑏) : 𝐴𝐹𝜋0 ⇒ 1
]︁
− Pr
[︁
𝐴RO ⇒ 1
]︁⃒⃒⃒
.
The resource parameterized advantage functions are defined as usual. Let
Advind𝐹𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁) = max𝐴Advind𝐹𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝐴) be the maximum advantage over all adversaries that
make 𝑞 queries to the left oracle, all of maximal length ℓ permutation calls if 𝐹 = FKS or that
make at most 𝑞 initialize() calls to the left oracle and issue at most ℓ duplexing queries after each
initialization if 𝐹 = FKD with total maximal multiplicity 𝜇 in both cases, and that make 𝑁 direct
queries to the public permutation. To simplify the analysis, we assume that each of the 𝑞 oracle
queries in fact consists of exactly ℓ permutation (or that the adversary indeed makes ℓ duplexing
calls after each initialization). This is without loss of generality, it can simply be achieved by giving
extra squeezing outputs to the adversary. Similarly, we define Advind𝐹𝜋0 (𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) = max𝐴Adv
ind
𝐹𝜋0
(𝐴),
noticing that in this case 𝑁 = 0, thus it is omitted from the resources.
4.3 Security Model for Even-Mansour
Our proof relies on a reduction to the security of a low-entropy single-key Even-Mansour construc-
tion [15, 16]. In more detail, let 𝑝 : {0, 1}𝑏 → {0, 1}𝑏 be a permutation and 𝐾 ∈ {0, 1}𝑘 be a key.
The Even-Mansour blockcipher is defined as
𝐸𝑝𝐾(𝑀) = 𝑝(𝑀 ⊕ (0𝑏−𝑘 ‖𝐾))⊕ (0𝑏−𝑘 ‖𝐾).
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We define the distinguishing advantage of any adversary 𝐴 against 𝐸 based on a public permuta-
tion 𝑝 as
Advprp
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝
(𝐴) =
⃒⃒⃒
Pr
[︁
𝐾
$←− {0, 1}𝑘, 𝑝 $←− Perm (𝑏) : 𝐴𝐸𝑝𝐾 ,𝑝,𝑝−1 ⇒ 1
]︁
−
Pr
[︁
𝜋, 𝑝
$←− Perm (𝑏) : 𝐴𝜋,𝑝,𝑝−1 ⇒ 1
]︁⃒⃒⃒
.
Let Advprp
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝
(𝑞, 𝜇,𝑁) = max𝐴Advprp𝐸𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝
(𝐴) be the maximum advantage over all adversaries that
make 𝑞 queries to the left oracle, with total maximal multiplicity 𝜇, and that make 𝑁 direct queries
to the public permutation.
5 Security Analysis of FKS
We prove the following result for FKS:
Theorem 1. Let 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑐, 𝑘 > 0 be such that 𝑏 = 𝑟+𝑐 and 𝑘 ≤ 𝑐. Let FKS be the scheme of Sect. 3.1.
Then,
AdvindFKS𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁) ≤
2(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑏 +
2𝑞2ℓ
2𝑐 +
𝜇𝑁
2𝑘 .
The proof follows to a certain extent the modular approach of [2], and in particular also uses
the observation that FKS𝑝𝐾 can alternatively be considered as FKS
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
0 , a clever observation used
before by Chang et al. [13]. Note that this observation only works for 𝑘 ≤ 𝑐: it consists of xoring
two dummy keys 𝐾 ⊕𝐾 in-between every two adjacent permutation calls, and if 𝑘 > 𝑐 this would
entail a difference in the squeezing blocks of FKS. This trick splits the security of FKS𝑝𝐾 into the
security of the Even-Mansour blockcipher and the security of FKS with secret primitive. Looking
back at [2], the security of Inner-keyed Sponge/Outer-keyed Sponge [2] with secret permutations
was simply reverted to the classical indifferentiability result of [6]. Because this is a rather loose
approach, and additionally because the indifferentiability bound cannot be used for FKS due to
its full-state absorption, we consider the security of FKS with secret primitive in more detail and
derive an improved bound.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1). Consider any adversary 𝐴 with resources (𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁). Note that
FKS𝑝𝐾 = FKS
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
0 . Therefore, by a modular argument,
AdvindFKS𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝐴) = 𝛥𝐴
(︁
FKS𝐸
𝑝
𝐾
0 , 𝑝;ROFKS, 𝑝
)︁
≤ 𝛥𝐵 (FKS𝜋0 , 𝑝;ROFKS, 𝑝) +𝛥𝐶 (𝐸𝑝𝐾 , 𝑝;𝜋, 𝑝)
= AdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝐵) +Adv
prp
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝
(𝐶)
for some adversary 𝐵 with resources (𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) and adversary 𝐶 with resources (𝑞ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁). Note
that 𝐵 also has access to 𝑝, but queries to this oracle are meaningless as its left oracle (FKS𝜋0 or
ROFKS) is independent of 𝑝.
In [2], it is proven thatAdvprp
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝
(𝐶) ≤ 𝜇𝑁2𝑘 for any 𝐶. In Lem. 2, we prove thatAdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝐵) ≤
2(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑏 +
2𝑞2ℓ
2𝑐 for any adversary 𝐵. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. Let 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑐 > 0 be such that 𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝑐. Let FKS be the scheme of Sect. 3.1. Then,
AdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) ≤
2(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑏 +
2𝑞2ℓ
2𝑐 .
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Proof. Given that the padding is publicly known and injective, we can generalize the setting,
and assume that the 𝑖th query 𝑀𝑖 has length divisible by 𝑏 and that 𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑖 ̸= 0𝑏, i.e. we assume
that all the queries are already padded. More detailed, for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞, we let 𝑚𝑖 = |𝑀𝑖|/𝑏 and
𝑀𝑖 = 𝑀1𝑖 ‖𝑀2𝑖 ‖ . . . ‖𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑖 s.t. |𝑀 𝑗𝑖 | = 𝑏 for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚𝑖. We further assume, that the adversary
always asks for output of length divisible by 𝑟 and that every query induces exactly ℓ primitive
calls. This is without loss of generality: we can simply output “free bits” to the adversary. We will
denote the 𝑏-bit state of FKS just before the 𝑗th application of 𝜋 is made when processing the
𝑖th query as 𝑠𝑗𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ. Similarly, we will denote the 𝑏-bit state of FKS just after the 𝑗th
application of 𝜋 in 𝑖th query as 𝑡𝑗𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ. We will call the former in-states and the latter
out-states. Note that every in-state 𝑠𝑗𝑖 is determined by the out-state 𝑡
𝑗−1
𝑖 and the block of query
𝑀 𝑗𝑖 as 𝑠
𝑗
𝑖 = 𝑡
𝑗−1
𝑖 ⊕𝑀 𝑗𝑖 in the absorbing phase or just by 𝑡𝑗𝑖 in the squeezing phase as depicted in
Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3: Processing the 𝑖th query.
To aid the simplicity of further analysis we additionally define initial dummy out-states 𝑡0𝑖 = 0𝑏
and extended queries ?¯?𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖 ‖ 0(ℓ−𝑚𝑖)𝑏 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞. Now we can express every in-state,
be it absorbing or squeezing, as 𝑠𝑗𝑖 = 𝑡
𝑗−1
𝑖 ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 . We will group the out-states of 𝑖th query as
𝑇𝑖 = {𝑡0𝑖 , 𝑡1𝑖 , . . . , 𝑡ℓ𝑖}. Because each query induces exactly ℓ calls to 𝜋, we know that a query 𝑀𝑖
will be answered by a string 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑍1𝑖 ‖ . . . ‖𝑍𝑧𝑖𝑖 with 𝑧𝑖 = ℓ−𝑚𝑖 + 1 and |𝑍𝑗𝑖 | = 𝑟 for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑧𝑖.
In particular, we have that 𝑍𝑗𝑖 = outer
(︁
𝑡𝑚𝑖+𝑗−1𝑖
)︁
.
The RP-RF Switch. We start by replacing the random permutation 𝜋 $←− Perm (𝑏) by a random
function 𝑓 $←− Func (𝑏) in the experiment. This will contribute the term (𝑞ℓ)2/2𝑏 to the final bound
by a standard hybrid argument so we have AdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) ≤ Adv
ind
FKS𝑓0
(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) + (𝑞ℓ)2/2𝑏.
Patarin’s Coefficient-H Technique. We will use the coefficient-H technique to show that
AdvindFKS𝑓0 (𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) ≤ (𝑞ℓ)
2/2𝑏 + 2𝑞2ℓ/2𝑐. The two systems an adversary is trying to distinguish are
FKS𝑓0 and ROFKS. We will refer to the former as 𝑋 and to the latter as 𝑌 . In either of the worlds,
the adversary makes 𝑞 queries 𝑀1, . . . ,𝑀𝑞 and learns the responses 𝑍1, . . . , 𝑍𝑞. The transition
from queries 𝑀𝑖 to ?¯?𝑖 is injective, and additionally the length 𝑚𝑖 of 𝑀𝑖 is implicit from ?¯?𝑖.
Therefore, we can summarize the interaction of the adversary with its oracle (𝑋 or 𝑌 ) with a
transcript (?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑞, 𝑍1, . . . , 𝑍𝑞).
To facilitate the analysis, we will disclose additional information 𝑇1, . . . , 𝑇𝑞 to the adversary
at the end of the experiment. In the real world, these are the out-states 𝑇𝑖 = {𝑡0𝑖 , 𝑡1𝑖 , . . . , 𝑡ℓ𝑖} as
discussed in the beginning of the proof. In the ideal world, these are dummy variables that satisfy
the following intrinsic properties of the Sponge construction:
1. 𝑡0𝑖 = 0𝑏 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞,
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2. if llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖, ?¯?𝑖′
)︀
= 𝑛 for 1 ≤ 𝑖, 𝑖′ ≤ 𝑞 then 𝑡𝑗𝑖 = 𝑡𝑗𝑖′ for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛,
3. outer
(︁
𝑡𝑗+𝑚𝑖−1𝑖
)︁
= 𝑍𝑗𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑧𝑖,
but are perfectly random otherwise. Note that in both worlds, 𝑍1, . . . , 𝑍𝑞 are fully determined by
𝑇1, . . . , 𝑇𝑞, so we can drop them from the transcript. Thus a transcript of adversary’s interaction
with FKS will be 𝜏 = (?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑞, 𝑇1, . . . , 𝑇𝑞).
With respect to Lem. 1, we will show that there exists a definition of bad transcripts 𝒯bad,
such that Pr [𝐷𝑋 = 𝜏 ] /Pr [𝐷𝑌 = 𝜏 ] = 1 for any 𝜏 ∈ 𝒯good = 𝒯 ∖𝒯bad, and thus AdvindFKS𝑓0 (𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) ≤
Pr [𝐷𝑌 ∈ 𝒯bad].
Definition of a Bad Transcript. Stated formally, a transcript 𝜏 is labeled as bad if
∃(1, 1) ≤ (𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖′, 𝑗′) ≤ (𝑞, ℓ) such that:
𝑗 ̸= 𝑗′ ∨ llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖, ?¯?𝑖′
)︀
< 𝑗 = 𝑗′ ≤ ℓ,
𝑡𝑗−1𝑖 ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 = 𝑡𝑗
′−1
𝑖′ ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗
′
𝑖′ .
(1)
This formalization of a bad transcript comes with an intuitive, informal interpretation; as long
as all relevant inputs 𝑠𝑗𝑖 = 𝑡
𝑗−1
𝑖 ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 to the random function 𝑓 induced by the Sponge function
are distinct the output of the Sponge will be distributed uniformly. We do not require uniqueness
of all in-states because the adversary can trivially force their repetition by issuing queries with
common prefixes, as we have argued earlier. However these collisions are not a problem because
uniqueness of the queries implies that llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖, ?¯?𝑖′
)︀
< max{𝑚𝑖,𝑚𝑖′} for any two queries ?¯?𝑖, ?¯?𝑖′ .
Even if the adversary truncates an old query and thus forces an old absorbing in-state 𝑠 to be
squeezed for output, it is still not a problem because the adversary has not seen the image 𝑓(𝑠)
before. Note that albeit in-states do not exist in the ideal world, they can be defined by the same
relation as in the real world, i.e. 𝑠𝑗𝑖 = 𝑡
𝑗−1
𝑖 ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 .
Bounding the Ratio of Probabilities of Good Transcripts. In the ideal world, the out-
states {𝑡0𝑖 }𝑞𝑖=0 are always assigned a value trivially. Beside that, we will also trivially assign a single
randomly sampled value to multiple state variables, that are affected by the common prefixes of
the queries. The remaining out-states are sampled uniformly at random. It follows that there are
exactly 𝜂(𝜏) =
∑︀𝑞
𝑖=1 ℓ− llcp𝑏 (𝑀𝑖;𝑀1, . . . ,𝑀𝑖−1) 𝑏-bit values in any transcript 𝜏 , that are sampled
independently and uniformly. We thus have Pr [𝐷𝑌 = 𝜏 ] = 2−𝜂(𝜏)𝑏 for any 𝜏 .
Let 𝛺𝑋 be the set of all possible real-world oracles. We have that |𝛺𝑋 | = 2𝑏2𝑏 . Let comp𝑋 (𝜏) ⊆
𝛺𝑋 be the set of all oracles compatible with the transcript 𝜏 , i.e. the set of the real-world oracles
that are capable of producing 𝜏 in an experiment. We will compute the probability of seeing 𝜏
in the real world as Pr [𝐷𝑋 = 𝜏 ] = |comp𝑋 (𝜏) |/|𝛺𝑋 |. Note that a real-world oracle is completely
determined by the underlying function 𝑓 .
If 𝜏 ∈ 𝒯good, then every in-state 𝑠𝑗𝑖 = 𝑡𝑗−1𝑖 ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 that does not trivially collide with some other
in-state 𝑠𝑗
′
𝑖′ due to common prefix of ?¯?
𝑗
𝑖 and ?¯?
𝑗′
𝑖′ must be distinct. The number of domain points
of 𝑓 that have an image assigned by 𝜏 is easily seen to be 𝜂(𝜏) =
∑︀𝑞
𝑖=1 ℓ− llcp𝑏 (𝑀𝑖;𝑀1, . . . ,𝑀𝑖−1).
A compatible function 𝑓 can therefore have arbitrary image values on the remaining 2𝑏 − 𝜂(𝜏)
domain points. Thus we compute |comp𝑋 (𝜏) | = 2𝑏(2
𝑏−𝜂(𝜏)) and
Pr [𝐷𝑋 = 𝜏 ] =
|comp𝑋 (𝜏) |
|𝛺𝑋 | =
2𝑏(2
𝑏−𝜂(𝜏))
2𝑏2𝑏
= 2−𝜂(𝜏)𝑏 = Pr [𝐷𝑌 = 𝜏 ] .
Bounding the Probability of a Bad Transcript in the Ideal World. We can bound the
probability of 𝜏 being bad (cf. (1)) by first bounding the collision probability of an arbitrary but
fixed pair of in-states 𝑠𝑗𝑖 , 𝑠
𝑗′
𝑖′ (i.e. the event 𝑠
𝑗
𝑖 = 𝑠
𝑗′
𝑖′ occurs) and then summing this probability for
all possible values of (𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖′, 𝑗′) with (𝑖′, 𝑗′) ̸= (𝑖, 𝑗). Because this probability varies significantly,
we will split all in-states into three classes and bound probabilities of individual collisions between
these classes.
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We will associate to each in-state 𝑠𝑗𝑖 a label stamp
𝑗
𝑖 . We set stamp
𝑗
𝑖 = free if 1 < 𝑗 =
llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
+1 ≤ 𝑚𝑖 such that𝑚𝑖* < 𝑗 for some 𝑖* < 𝑖. We will set stamp1𝑖 = initial
for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞 and stamp𝑗𝑖 = fixed in the remaining cases. Informally, we have stamp𝑗𝑖 = free
whenever the adversary forces outer
(︁
𝑡𝑗−1𝑖
)︁
= 𝑍𝑗−𝑚𝑖*−1𝑖* by reusing exactly first 𝑗 − 1 blocks of
a previous query ?¯?𝑖* in ?¯?𝑖 and sets ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 ̸= ?¯? 𝑗𝑖* = 0𝑏. By doing this, it freely but non-trivially
chooses outer
(︁
𝑠𝑗𝑖
)︁
= outer
(︁
𝑠𝑗𝑖* ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗𝑖* ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗𝑖
)︁
. Note that if the adversary puts ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 = ?¯?
𝑗
𝑖* , this is
not counted as a free state (the states will in fact be the same). We have stamp𝑗𝑖 = initial for
the initial in-state of every query.
As the condition (1) is symmetrical w.r.t. (𝑖, 𝑗) and (𝑖′, 𝑗′), and as it cannot be satisfied if
(𝑖, 𝑗) = (𝑖′, 𝑗′), it can be rephrased as
∃(1, 1) ≤ (𝑖′, 𝑗′) < (𝑖, 𝑗) ≤ (𝑞, ℓ) such that:
llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
< 𝑗 ≤ ℓ, 𝑠𝑗𝑖 = 𝑠𝑗
′
𝑖′ .
(2)
Doing so is without loss of generality, as each 𝑠𝑗𝑖 with 𝑗 ≤ llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
is identical
with some previous state that has already been checked for collisions with 𝑠𝑗
′
𝑖′ for every possible
(𝑖′, 𝑗′). In the further analysis, we will be working with (2) rather than with (1).
We will now bound the probability of collision of an arbitrary pair of in-states (𝑠𝑗𝑖 , 𝑠
𝑗′
𝑖′ ) =
(𝑡𝑗−1𝑖 ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗
′−1
𝑖′ ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗
′
𝑖′ ) with stamp
𝑗
𝑖 = fixed. We fix arbitrary 𝑖 and investigate the following
three cases for 𝑗. In each case we treat every (𝑖′, 𝑗′) < (𝑖, 𝑗).
Case 1: llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
+ 1 < 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚𝑖. In this case, 𝑡𝑗−1𝑖 is undetermined when the
adversary issues the query ?¯?𝑖. This implies that it will be independent from all 𝑡𝑗
′−1
𝑖′ for any
(𝑖′, 𝑗′) < (𝑖, 𝑗). The probability of the collision 𝑡𝑗−1𝑖 ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 = 𝑡𝑗
′−1
𝑖′ ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗
′
𝑖′ is easily seen to be
2−𝑏.
Case 2: max
{︀
llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
+ 1,𝑚𝑖
}︀
< 𝑗 ≤ ℓ. Here 𝑡𝑗−1𝑖 =
𝑍𝑗−𝑚𝑖𝑖 ‖ inner
(︁
𝑡𝑗−1𝑖
)︁
and ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 = 0𝑏. Although the adversary learns the value of 𝑍
𝑗−𝑚𝑖
𝑖 dur-
ing the experiment, this is independent of all 𝑠𝑗
′
𝑖′ with (𝑖′, 𝑗′) < (𝑖, 𝑗) (because 𝑗 + 1 >
llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
). Even if stamp𝑗
′
𝑖′ ∈ {free, initial} and outer
(︁
𝑠𝑗
′
𝑖′
)︁
= 𝛼 for some
value 𝛼 chosen by the adversary, the collision 𝑍𝑗−𝑚𝑖𝑖 ‖ inner
(︁
𝑡𝑗−1𝑖
)︁
= 𝛼 ‖ inner
(︁
𝑠𝑗
′
𝑖′
)︁
happens
with probability 2−𝑏.
Case 3: 𝑗 = llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
+ 1. If 𝑗 = llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖, ?¯?𝑖′
)︀
+ 1, the in-state 𝑠𝑗
′=𝑗
𝑖′ , call
it a twin-state of 𝑠𝑗𝑖 , cannot collide with 𝑠
𝑗
𝑖 , as by the second trivial property 𝑡
𝑗−1
𝑖 = 𝑡
𝑗−1
𝑖′
and by 𝑗 − 1 = llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖, ?¯?𝑖′
)︀
we have ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 ̸= ?¯? 𝑗𝑖′ . Note that if there was an 𝑖* < 𝑖 with
𝑚𝑖* ≤ llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖, ?¯?𝑖*
)︀
= 𝑗 − 1 and 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚𝑖 then we would have stamp𝑗𝑖 = free. However if we
had the same situation but with 𝑗 > 𝑚𝑖 then ?¯?𝑖 and ?¯?𝑖* would be identical. So outer
(︁
𝑡𝑗−1𝑖
)︁
has not been set and revealed to the adversary by any previous output value and for any
non-twin, in-state 𝑠𝑗
′
𝑖′ , the probability of collision is at most 2−𝑏 by a similar argument as in
Case 1.
There are no more than 𝑞ℓ choices for (𝑖, 𝑗) and no more than 𝑞ℓ possible (𝑖′, 𝑗′) for every (𝑖, 𝑗)
so the overall probability that the condition (2) will be evaluated due to a pair of in-states with
stamp𝑗𝑖 = fixed is at most (𝑞ℓ)2/2𝑏.
If stamp𝑗𝑖 = free then outer
(︁
𝑠𝑗𝑖
)︁
is under adversary’s control. However the value of inner
(︁
𝑡𝑗−1𝑖
)︁
is always generated at the end of the experiment. By a case analysis similar to the previous one
we can verify that the probability of a collision due to a pair of in-states with stamp𝑗𝑖 = free is
not bigger than 2−𝑐. It is apparent from the definition of a free in-state that there is at most
one such in-state for each query. Having 𝑞ℓ in-states in total, there are at most 𝑞(𝑞ℓ) pairs with
stamp𝑗𝑖 = free and the probability of 𝜏 ∈ 𝒯bad due to such a pair is at most 𝑞2ℓ/2𝑐.
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If stamp𝑗𝑖 = initial then 𝑠
𝑗
𝑖 cannot non-trivially collide with any other initial in-state. A
collision with a non-initial state 𝑠𝑗
′
𝑖′ implies that 𝑡
𝑗′−1
𝑖′ = ?¯?
𝑗′
𝑖′ ⊕?¯?1𝑖 . If 𝑗′ > 𝑚𝑖′ or if there is some
𝑀𝑖* with 𝑚𝑖* < 𝑗′ <= llcp𝑏
(︀
𝑀𝑖′ , ?¯?𝑖*
)︀
+1, then outer
(︁
𝑡𝑗
′−1
𝑖′
)︁
is known to the adversary. However
inner
(︁
𝑡𝑗
′−1
𝑖′
)︁
is always generated at the end of the experiment. By a case analysis similar to the
one we carried out earlier, it can be verified that the collision 𝑠1𝑖 = 𝑠
𝑗′
𝑖′ occurs with probability no
bigger than 2−𝑐. There is exactly one initial in-state in each query, so similarly as with the free
in-states, the overall probability of a transcript being bad due to a pair with an initial in-state is
at most 𝑞2ℓ/2𝑐. By summing all the partial collision probabilities we obtain that Pr [𝐷𝑌 ∈ 𝒯𝑏𝑎𝑑] ≤
(𝑞ℓ)2/2𝑏 + 2𝑞2ℓ/2𝑐. ⊓⊔
6 Security Analysis of FKD
For FKD, we prove the following result:
Theorem 2. Let 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑐, 𝑘 > 0 be such that 𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝑐 and 𝑘 ≤ 𝑐. Let FKD be the scheme of
Sect. 3.2. Then,
AdvindFKD𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁) ≤
(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑏 +
(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑐 +
𝜇𝑁
2𝑘 .
The proof uses Lem. 3 to transform a FKD adversary into an FKS adversary, similarly to [8, 10].
While this would be sufficient to prove the security of the Duplex construction, the bound induced
solely by Lem. 3 suffers from a quantitative degradation: we have that AdvindFKD𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁) ≤
AdvindFKS𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝑞ℓ, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁), resulting in a bound
2𝑞2ℓ4
2𝑏 +
2𝑞2ℓ3
2𝑐 +
𝜇𝑁
2𝑘 according to Thm. 1. In reality, there
will be a quantitative gap between the security of FKD construction and that of FKS present, but
it will be smaller. This is because an FKS adversary constructed from an FKD adversary issues
queries of a specific structure which is far from general. In below proof for FKD, we use this
property. In more detail, we derive a specific class of “constrained adversaries” and generalize the
proof of Lem. 2 to these adversaries.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5). Consider any adversary 𝐴 with resources (𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁). We have that
FKD𝑝𝐾 = FKD
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
0 . Therefore, by a modular argument,
AdvindFKD𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝐴) = 𝛥𝐴
(︁
FKD𝐸
𝑝
𝐾
0 , 𝑝;ROFKD, 𝑝
)︁
≤ 𝛥𝐵 (FKD𝜋0 , 𝑝;ROFKD, 𝑝) +𝛥𝐶 (𝐸𝑝𝐾 , 𝑝;𝜋, 𝑝)
≤ AdvindFKD𝜋0 (𝐵) +Adv
sprp
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝
(𝐶)
for some adversary 𝐵 with resources (𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) and adversary 𝐶 with resources (𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁). Note
that 𝐵 also has access to 𝑝, but these queries are meaningless as its left oracle (FKD𝜋0 or ROFKD)
is independent of 𝑝.
In [2], it is proven that Advsprp
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝
(𝐶) ≤ 𝜇𝑁/2𝑘. In Cor. 3 we show that any FKD adversary 𝐵
can be turned into a special “constrained” adversary 𝐵′ against FKS with resources (𝑞ℓ, ℓ, 𝜇):
AdvindFKD𝜋0 (𝐵) ≤ Adv
ind
FKS𝜋0 (𝐵
′).
In Lem. 4, we prove that AdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝐵
′) ≤ (𝑞ℓ)2/2𝑏 + (𝑞ℓ)2/2𝑐 for any such adversary 𝐵′. ⊓⊔
For the remainder of the proof, we introduce the mapping 𝑄FKS : ({0, 1}<𝑏)+ → {0, 1}*. For any
𝑏 > 0 and for all 𝑋1, . . . , 𝑋𝑛 ∈ {0, 1}<𝑏 we let
𝑄FKS(𝑋1, . . . , 𝑋𝑛) = pad𝑏(𝑋1) ‖ . . . ‖ pad𝑏(𝑋𝑛−1) ‖𝑋𝑛.
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Lemma 3 (Duplexing lemma [10]). Let 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑐, 𝑘 > 0 be such that 𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝑐 and 𝑘 ≤ 𝑐. Let
𝐷 = FKD𝑝 as defined in Sect. 3.2. Then for the 𝑖th duplexing query (𝑀𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) made after the last
𝐷.initialize(𝐾) we have
𝑍𝑖 = 𝐷.duplexing (𝑀𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) = FKS𝑝(𝐾,𝑄FKS(𝑀1, . . . ,𝑀𝑖), 𝑧𝑖).
Moreover, the mapping 𝑄FKS : ({0, 1}<𝑏)+ → {0, 1}* is injective.
Proof. We will show the first claim by induction. For 𝑖 = 1, the internal state of FKD is updated
to 𝑡1 = 𝑝
(︀
(0𝑏−𝑘 ‖𝐾)⊕ pad𝑏(𝑀1)
)︀
, which is exactly the same as the state of FKS evaluated on
𝑀1 only. Then both FKD and FKS output the same value 𝑍1 = left𝑧1 (𝑡1). For every 𝑖 > 1, FKD
updates its state to 𝑡𝑖 = 𝑝 (𝑡𝑖−1 ⊕ pad𝑏(𝑀𝑖)). By the induction argument, 𝑡𝑖−1 is also the state of
FKS after processing the first 𝑖 − 1 padded blocks. Then the final state of FKS is easily seen to
be 𝑡𝑖 as well. The equality of outputs follows trivially.
To verify the injectivity of𝑄FKS, we will show how to invert it. For any image𝑋 = 𝑄FKS(𝑋1, . . . , 𝑋𝑛),
we can start recovering the input arguments from the left to right. Firstly, we have 𝑛 = ⌈|𝑋|/𝑏⌉.
While |𝑋| > 𝑏, we keep removing the leftmost 𝑏 bits of 𝑋 and applying the inverse of pad𝑏 to
them to recover the next component 𝑋𝑖. What remains is the unpadded block 𝑋𝑛. ⊓⊔
The result of Lem. 3 can be used to reduce any FKD adversary to a constrained FKS adversary.
More specifically, any adversary 𝐴 against FKD that makes 𝑞 initialize calls and duplexes ℓ blocks
after each initialization can be reduced to a constrained FKS adversary 𝐴′ = 𝑅FKS(𝐴). To answer
the 𝑗th duplexing query (𝑀 𝑗𝑖 , 𝑧
𝑗
𝑖 ) made by 𝐴 after the 𝑖th initialize call, 𝐴′ queries its own oracle
with (𝑄FKS(𝑀1𝑖 , . . . ,𝑀
𝑗
𝑖 ), 𝑧
𝑗
𝑖 ). 𝐴′ copies the output of 𝐴 at the end of the experiment.
Corollary 3. Let 𝐴 be an adversary against FKD that makes 𝑞 initialize calls and duplexes ℓ
blocks after each initialization and 𝑅FKS(𝐴) the constrained FKS adversary as defined above. It
follows from Lem. 3, that AdvindFKD𝜋0 (𝐴) ≤ Adv
ind
FKS𝜋0 (𝑅FKS(𝐴)).
We denote by 𝒜′𝑞,ℓ the set of constrained adversaries against FKS, that were induced by some
FKD adversary that makes 𝑞 initialize calls and duplexes ℓ blocks after each initialization:
𝒜′𝑞,ℓ = {𝑅FKS(𝐴) : 𝐴 an FKD adversary with resources (𝑞, ℓ)}.
Lemma 4. Let 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑐 > 0 be such that 𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝑐. Let FKS be the scheme of Sect. 3.1. Then,
AdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝐴
′) ≤ (𝑞ℓ)
2
2𝑏 +
(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑐 ,
for any constrained adversary 𝐴′ ∈ 𝒜′𝑞,ℓ
Proof. We will to large extent follow the notation and conventions from the proof of Lem. 2. We
assume that every query is already padded and ends with a non-zero final 𝑏-bit block with 𝑚𝑖
being the number of 𝑏-bit blocks in the query 𝑀𝑖. The structure of the queries and the number of
squeezed bits will however differ.
Any adversary 𝐴′ ∈ 𝒜′𝑞,ℓ makes exactly 𝑞ℓ FKS queries but these queries comprise at most
𝑞ℓ unique 𝑏-bit blocks. Moreover, these queries follow a certain pattern. We have that for every
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞:
𝑀ℓ(𝑖−1)+1 =𝑀1ℓ(𝑖−1)+1 and 𝑀ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 =𝑀ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗−1 ‖𝑀 𝑗ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 for 2 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ,
where all 𝑀 𝑗ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 ∈ {0, 1}𝑏 are non-zero (due to padding). Note that we have 𝑚ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 = 𝑗.
For every query, 𝐴′ asks for no more than 𝑟 output bits.
Because we know the specific structure of the adversarial queries made by 𝐴′, the extended
queries are now identical with the original queries. Indeed we have for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ
that ?¯?ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 =𝑀ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 . The internal in-states 𝑠𝑗𝑖 and out-states 𝑡
𝑗
𝑖 are defined the same way
as before.
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The RP-RF Switch. We will replace the random permutation 𝜋 $←− Perm (𝑏) by a random
function 𝑓 $←− Func (𝑏) in the experiment. Although there are 𝑞∑︀ℓ𝑗=1 𝑗 = 𝑞ℓ(ℓ + 1)/2 calls to 𝜋
made throughout the experiment, the structure of the queries implies, that there will be at most
𝑞ℓ calls to 𝜋 with unique input. Thus the switching will contribute the term (𝑞ℓ)2/2𝑏 to the final
bound by a standard hybrid argument. We have AdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝐴
′) ≤ AdvindFKS𝑓0 (𝐴
′) + (𝑞ℓ)2/2𝑏.
Patarin’s Coefficient-H Technique. This part of the proof relies heavily on the correspond-
ing part of the proof of Lem. 2. We will show that AdvindFKS𝑓0 (𝐴
′) ≤ (𝑞ℓ)2/2𝑐.
The two systems an adversary is trying to distinguish are FKS𝑓0 and ROFKS. We will use the
same definition of a transcript 𝜏 = (?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑞ℓ, 𝑇1, . . . , 𝑇𝑞ℓ) where 𝑇ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 holds all the 𝑗+1 out-
states appearing due to ?¯?ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 (including the dummy state 𝑡0ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗). We will also use the same
definition of a bad state (q.v. (1)). This will immediately give us Pr [𝐷𝑋 = 𝜏 ] /Pr [𝐷𝑌 = 𝜏 ] = 1
for any 𝜏 ∈ 𝒯good by a similar argument as in the proof of Lem. 2. The probability Pr [𝐷𝑌 ∈ 𝒯𝑏𝑎𝑑]
needs new investigation.
Bounding the Probability of a Bad Transcript in the Ideal World. We define the
three possible labels of in-states, free, initial and fixed in the same way as before and we will
work with the re-expressed definition of a bad state (2). Since the definitions of free, initial
and fixed states are unchanged, the probabilities of collision due to a pair of in-states 𝑠𝑗𝑖 , 𝑠
𝑗′
𝑖′ with
stamp𝑗𝑖 = free, stamp
𝑗
𝑖 = initial and stamp
𝑗
𝑖 = fixed do not change. The only thing that really
changes is the final counting.
For any 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞, the query ?¯?ℓ(𝑖−1)+1 = 𝑀1𝑖 consists of a single block. Thus it only
induces a single in-state with stamp1ℓ(𝑖−1)+1 = initial. Then for any 2 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ, we have
llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 , ?¯?ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗−1
)︀
= 𝑗 − 1, so there is at most one new in-state induced by ?¯?ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗
and unaffected by the common prefix with previous queries. It is 𝑠𝑗ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 and we always have
stamp𝑗ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 = free.
We see that, w.r.t. (2), for every value of 𝑖, ℓ states need to be considered, giving us a total
amount of 𝑞ℓ possible tuples (𝑖, 𝑗). For any such state 𝑠𝑗ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 , we need to count all other states
(visited by (𝑖′, 𝑗′) in (2)) with which it can collide. For any 𝑖′ < 𝑖, it suffices to check equality of
𝑠𝑗ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 with all ℓ in-states induced by ?¯?ℓ(𝑖′−1)+ℓ, as every other query ?¯?ℓ(𝑖′−1)+𝑗′ is its prefix.
For 𝑖′ = 𝑖, it suffices to look at in-states induced by ?¯?ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗−1. Thus for any state 𝑠𝑗ℓ(𝑖−1)+𝑗 ,
there are no more than 𝑞ℓ unique states, with which it can collide. Using the collision probabilities
from the proof of Lem. 2, we conclude that Pr [𝐷𝑌 ∈ 𝒯𝑏𝑎𝑑] ≤ (𝑞ℓ)2/2𝑐. ⊓⊔
7 Full-State SpongeWrap and its Security
Our results from Sect. 6 can be used to prove security of modified, more efficient versions of existing
Sponge-based AE schemes. As an interesting instance, we introduce Full-state SpongeWrap, a
variant of the authenticated encryption mode SpongeWrap [8, 10], offering improved efficiency
with respect to processing of associated data (AD).
7.1 Authenticated Encryption for Sequences of Messages
We will focus on authenticated encryption schemes that act on sequences of AD-message pairs.
Following Bertoni et al.5 [8, 10]we will think of an authenticated encryption scheme as an object
𝑊 surfacing three APIs:
– 𝑊.initialize(𝐾,𝑁): calling this function will initialize 𝑊 with a secret key from the set of keys
𝒦 and a nonce from the set of nonces 𝒩 .
5 Bertoni et al. do not consider an explicit nonce as we do; they rather require the header of the first
wrapping call to be unique.
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– 𝑊.wrap(𝐴,𝑀): this function inputs an AD-message pair (𝐴,𝑀) and outputs a ciphertext-tag
pair (𝐶, 𝑇 ), where |𝐶| = |𝑀 | and 𝑇 is a 𝜏 -bit tag authenticating (𝐴,𝑀) and all the queries
processed by 𝑊 so far (i.e. since the last initialization call).
– 𝑊.unwrap(𝐴,𝐶, 𝑇 ): this function accepts a triple of AD, ciphertext and tag, and outputs a
message 𝑀 if 𝐶 is an encryption of 𝑀 and 𝑇 is a valid tag for (𝐴,𝑀), and all the previous
queries processed by 𝑊 so far; otherwise it outputs an error symbol ⊥.
Here, the AD, messages and ciphertexts are finite strings and we have |𝐶| = |𝑀 |. 𝜏 is a positive
integer and we call it the expansion of 𝑊 . We require that 𝑊 is initialized before making the first
wrapping or unwrapping call. For a given key 𝐾, we will use 𝑊𝐾 to refer to the corresponding
keyed instance, omitting 𝐾 from the list of inputs; that is, 𝑊.initialize(𝐾,𝑁) =𝑊𝐾 .initialize(𝑁).
Security of Authenticated Encryption. We follow Bertoni et al. [8, 10] for defining the
security of AE. We split the twofold security goal of AE into two separate requirements: privacy
and authenticity.
Let 𝑊 be a scheme for authenticated encryption, as described above, that internally makes
calls to a public random permutation 𝑝. We formalize the privacy of 𝑊 by an experiment in
which an adversary 𝐴 is given access to 𝑝, 𝑝−1 and an oracle 𝑂 that provides two interfaces:
𝑂.initialize(𝑁) and 𝑂.wrap(𝐴,𝑀). We have 𝑂 ∈ {𝑊𝐾 ,RO𝑊 }, where 𝑊𝐾 is an instance of the
real scheme with the key 𝐾, and RO𝑊 is an ideal primitive that acts as follows: it keeps a list
of strings 𝑆𝑡 ∈ ({0, 1}*)* as its internal state. On calling RO𝑊 .initialize(𝑁) the list 𝑆𝑡 is set to
the empty list and then the nonce 𝑁 is added to the list (denote this operation by 𝑆𝑡← 𝑆𝑡||𝑁);
now each call RO𝑊 .wrap(𝐴,𝑀) will first update the list as 𝑆𝑡← 𝑆𝑡||(𝐴,𝑀) and then will output
left|𝑀 |+𝜏 (RO∞(⟨𝑆𝑡⟩)), where ⟨𝑆𝑡⟩ denotes an injective encoding of the list 𝑆𝑡 into a string in
{0, 1}*. (Note that the list 𝑆𝑡 preserves the boundaries between 𝑁 and all the queried AD-message
pairs.)
The adversary must distinguish between the two worlds: the real world where it is interacting
with 𝑊𝐾 and the ideal world where it is interacting with RO𝑊 . The advantage of the adversary
in doing so is defined as
Advpriv𝑊 [𝑝](𝐴) =
⃒⃒⃒
Pr
[︁
𝐾
$←− 𝒦 : 𝐴𝑊𝐾 ,𝑝,𝑝−1 ⇒ 1
]︁
− Pr
[︁
𝐴RO𝑊 ,𝑝,𝑝
−1 ⇒ 1
]︁⃒⃒⃒
.
It is assumed that the adversary meets the nonce-requirement, i.e. that every initialize() it makes
is done with a fresh nonce.
For the definition of authenticity property, consider an experiment where an adversary 𝐴 is
given access to the oracle𝑊𝐾 and is allowed to ask queries𝑊𝐾 .initialize(𝑁) and𝑊𝐾 .wrap(𝐴,𝑀).
It is assumed that 𝐴 respects the nonce-requirement in the wrapping queries. 𝐴 is again allowed
to query 𝑝. The adversary can also attempt forgeries at any time during the experiment; we say
that the adversary forges if it outputs a sequence (𝑁, (𝐴1, 𝐶1, 𝑇1), . . . , (𝐴𝑛, 𝐶𝑛, 𝑇𝑛)) such that after
calling 𝑊.initialize(𝐾,𝑁) and then 𝑊.unwrap(𝐴𝑖, 𝐶𝑖, 𝑇𝑖) for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛−1, 𝑊.unwrap(𝐴𝑛, 𝐶𝑛, 𝑇𝑛)
does not return ⊥. The sequence (𝑁, (𝐴1, 𝐶1, 𝑇1), . . . , (𝐴𝑛, 𝐶𝑛, 𝑇𝑛)) must be such that the ad-
versary has not obtained (𝐶𝑛, 𝑇𝑛) from a wrapping query that followed an initialization with 𝑁
and a series of wrapping queries (𝐴1,𝑀1), . . . , (𝐴𝑛,𝑀𝑛) with some 𝑀1, . . . ,𝑀𝑛. The adversary
does not have to use a unique nonce in the forgery. Note that it can be assumed w.l.o.g. that
every forgery attempt is either a fresh nonce followed by a single AD-ciphertext-tag triplet or of
the form (𝑁, (𝐴1, 𝐶1, 𝑇1), . . . , (𝐴𝑛, 𝐶𝑛, 𝑇𝑛)) with (𝑁, (𝐴1, 𝐶1, 𝑇1), . . . , (𝐴𝑛−1, 𝐶𝑛−1, 𝑇𝑛−1)) being
learned by the adversary from a sequence of previous wrapping queries. We define the advantage
of 𝐴 as
Advauth𝑊 [𝑝](𝐴) = Pr
[︁
𝐾
$←− 𝒦 : 𝐴𝑊𝐾 ,𝑝,𝑝−1 forges
]︁
.
We let Advpriv𝑊 [𝑝](𝑞𝑣, 𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁) = max𝐴Adv
priv
𝑊 [𝑝](𝐴) be the maximum advantage over all adver-
saries that make 𝑞 initialize queries to the left oracle, and after each initialization do wrapping
queries that induce at most ℓ permutation calls (including the initialization) and with total max-
imal multiplicity 𝜇, and that make 𝑁 direct queries to the public permutation, and that make at
most 𝑞𝑣 forgery attempts. We similarly let Advauth𝑊 [𝑝](𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁) = max𝐴Advauth𝑊 [𝑝](𝐴).
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Algorithm 3 Outline of an FSW[𝑝, 𝑟, 𝑘, 𝑛, 𝜏 ] wrap/unwrap(𝐴,𝑀) query
1: while there are both AD and message bits to process do
2: take ≤ 𝑟 bit block of 𝑀 and ≤ 𝑐− 5 bit block of 𝐴
3: wrap/unwrap the message block
4: if both 𝐴 and 𝑀 end then
5: produce tag using frame bits 𝐹AM
6: else if only 𝐴 ends or only 𝑀 ends then
7: process the blocks using frame bits 𝐹AM|
8: else
9: process the blocks using frame bits 𝐹AM
10: while there are message bits to process do
11: take ≤ 𝑟 bit block of 𝑀
12: wrap/unwrap the message block
13: if 𝑀 ends then
14: produce tag using frame bits 𝐹M
15: else
16: process the blocks using frame bits 𝐹M
17: while there are AD bits to process do
18: take ≤ 𝑟 + 𝑐− 5 bit block of 𝐴, split it into 𝑟 bit and 𝑐− 5 bit parts
19: if 𝐴 ends then
20: produce tag using frame bits 𝐹A
21: else
22: process the parts using frame bits 𝐹A
23: prepare 𝑟 random bits for next query using frame bits 𝐹N
7.2 Full-State SpongeWrap
The Full-State SpongeWrap (FSW) is a permutation mode for authenticated encryption of AD-
message sequences as described in Sect. 7.1. It is parametrized by a 𝑏-bit permutation 𝑝, the
maximal message block size 𝑟, the key size 𝑘, the nonce size 𝑛, and the tag size 𝜏 > 0. We require
that 𝑘 ≤ 𝑏− 𝑟 =: 𝑐 and 𝑛 < 𝑟. The set of keys is 𝒦 = {0, 1}𝑘 and the set of nonces is 𝒩 = {0, 1}𝑛.
The FSW construction uses an instance of FKD internally to process the inputs block by block. To
ensure domain separation of different stages of processing a query, we use three frame bits placed
at the same position in each duplexing call to FKD as explained in Table 1.
The main motivation of the FSW is concurrent absorption of message and AD to achieve
maximal efficiency in terms of minimizing the number of permutation calls made. Since we can
only process 𝑟 bits of a message input at a time, we can use the remainder of the state for the
frame bits and a block of AD. This implies the lengths of message and AD blocks processed with
each permutation call; 𝑟+1 bits for padded message block, 3 frame bits and (having in mind that
the input to FKD is always padded) this leaves us at most (𝑏 − 1) − (𝑟 + 1) − 3 = 𝑐 − 5 bits for
a block of AD. To minimize the number of permutation calls made in all possible situations, we
further specify special treatment for the wrap/unwrap queries with more AD blocks than message
blocks. An informal outline of a wrap/unwrap query is given in Algorithm 3. This outline nicely
illustrates how the frame bits are used for domain separation.
We next give a complete algorithmic description of the FSW. To keep it compact, we introduce
the following notations. For any 𝐿 ∈ {0, 1}≤𝑟, 𝑅 ∈ {0, 1}≤𝑐−5 and 𝐹 ∈ {0, 1}3, we let
𝑄(𝐿,𝐹,𝑅) = pad𝑟+1(𝐿) ‖ 𝐹 ‖𝑅. (3)
Note that 𝑟 + 4 ≤ |𝑄(𝐿,𝐹,𝑅)| ≤ 𝑏 − 1 for any 𝐿,𝐹,𝑅. We let (𝐿,𝑅) = lsplit(𝑋,𝑛) for any
𝑋 ∈ {0, 1}* such that 𝐿 = leftmin(|𝑋|,𝑛) (𝑋) and right|𝑋|−|𝐿| (𝑋). We let 𝑋1 ‖𝑋2 ‖ . . . ‖𝑋𝑚 𝑟←− 𝑋
denote partitioning a string𝑋 in such a way that𝑋 = 𝑋1‖𝑋2‖ . . . ‖𝑋𝑚, |𝑋𝑖| = 𝑟 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑚 and
0 < |𝑋𝑚| ≤ 𝑟. Note that 𝑚 = ⌈|𝑋|/𝑟⌉. We will use the abbreviation 𝐷.dpx(𝑀, 𝑧) for the interface
𝐷.duplexing (𝑀, 𝑧) of an FKD 𝐷. The interfaces of FSW[𝑝, 𝑟, 𝑘, 𝑛, 𝜏 ] are defined in Algo. 4. A
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label value usage
𝐹N 000 process nonce, derive initial mask of a query
𝐹AM 001 block of 𝐴 and 𝑀 inside query
𝐹M 010 block of 𝑀 inside query
𝐹A 011 block of 𝐴 inside query
𝐹AM| 100 last block of 𝐴 and 𝑀 inside query
𝐹AM 101 last block of 𝐴 and 𝑀 , query ends, produces tag
𝐹M 110 last block of 𝑀 , query ends, produces tag
𝐹A 111 last block of 𝐴, query ends, produces tag
Table 1: Labeling and usage of the frame bits within FSW.
schematic depiction of how the wrap interface processes various types of inputs is given in Figures
4 and 5.
7.3 Security of FSW
The security of FSW is relatively easy to analyze, thanks to the result from Sect. 6.
Lemma 5. Let𝑊 = FSW[𝑝, 𝑟, 𝑘, 𝑛, 𝜏 ] be an instance of FSW as described in Sect. 7.2. Denote any
query to 𝑊.initialize and a list of subsequent queries to 𝑊.wrap by (𝑁, (𝐴1,𝑀1), . . . , (𝐴𝑛,𝑀𝑛)).
Then, FSW injectively maps this sequence to a sequence of corresponding FKD duplexing queries
(𝑄1, . . . , 𝑄𝑑).
Proof. We prove the injectivity of the mapping by showing how it can be inverted. We refer to the
mapping 𝑄 of (3) to argue that every 𝑄𝑖 can be split into three strings 𝐿𝑖, 𝐹𝑖, 𝑅𝑖 with |𝐿𝑖| = 𝑟+1,
|𝐹𝑖| = 3 and |𝑅𝑖| ≤ 𝑐 − 5 just as depicted in Fig. 6. The main trick is to use the frame bits used
in FSW to determine boundaries of wrapping queries and their logical parts. We will refer to the
FKD queries as “frames”.
We can recover the AD-message pairs (in the following just “pair”) from Q = (𝑄1, . . . , 𝑄𝑑) in
a left-to-right fashion. Any pair (𝐴,𝑀) is encoded in a subsequence of Q that starts by a frame
with frame bits 𝐹N and ends by a frame just before the next frame with frame bits 𝐹N. Depending
on the lengths of 𝐴 and 𝑀 , the pattern of frame bits between these boundary frames can differ
as depicted in Fig. 6.
If both 𝐴 and 𝑀 are non-empty, we follow the edge marked as A. If there is the same number
of 𝑟-bit blocks in 𝑀 as there is of 𝑐− 5 bit blocks in 𝐴, then we follow the path A.1. Otherwise we
follow the path A.2 and then A.21 if there were fewer blocks in 𝐴 than in 𝑀 and the path A.22 if
there were in turn more blocks in 𝐴 than in 𝑀 .
If 𝑀 ̸= 𝐴 = 𝜀, then we follow the path B; if 𝐴 ̸= 𝑀 = 𝜀 we follow the path C. In a special
case, where both 𝐴 =𝑀 = 𝜀, we follow path D. We can see, that every possible case of lengths of
𝑀 and 𝐴 in terms of blocks yields a distinct pattern of frame bit sequences.
Having identified which path in Fig. 6 we are following, we can recover 𝐴 and 𝑀 . Every frame
𝑄𝑖 with 𝐹𝑖 ∈ {𝐹AM, 𝐹AM|} holds a padded block of 𝑀 in 𝐿𝑖 and an unpadded block of 𝐴 in 𝑅𝑖. If
𝐹𝑖 = 𝐹M, then there is a padded block of 𝑀 in 𝐿𝑖 and 𝑅𝑖 = 𝜀. If 𝐹𝑖 = 𝐹A, then there is a padded
block of 𝐴 in 𝐿𝑖 and another unpadded block of 𝐴 in 𝑅𝑖. The frames with 𝐹𝑖 ∈ {𝐹AM, 𝐹M, 𝐹A}
are used to produce the tag and are thus treated specially. The first frame with 𝐹𝜒 holds data
blocks and the following ones do not. If 𝜒 = AM, then there is a padded block of 𝑀 in 𝐿𝑖 and an
unpadded block of 𝐴 in 𝑅𝑖. If 𝜒 = M, then there is only a padded block of 𝑀 in 𝐿𝑖. If 𝜒 = A and
we are not on path D then there is a padded block of 𝐴 in 𝐿𝑖 and a following unpadded block of
𝐴 in 𝑅𝑖. If we are on path D then none of the frames holds any data, since both 𝐴 and 𝑀 are
empty.
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Algorithm 4 FSW[𝑝, 𝑟, 𝑘, 𝑛, 𝜏 ]
1: Interface 𝑊.initialize(𝐾,𝑁)
2: 𝐷.initialize(𝐾)
3: 𝑆 ← pad𝑟(𝑁) ‖ 0 ‖ 𝐹N ‖ 0𝑐−5
4: 𝑍 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑆, 𝑟)
1: Interface 𝑊.wrap(𝐴,𝑀)
2: 𝑀1 ‖ . . . ‖𝑀𝑚 𝑟←−𝑀
3: (𝐴′, 𝐴*)← lsplit(𝐴,𝑚(𝑐− 5))
4: 𝐴′1 ‖ . . . ‖𝐴′𝑎′ 𝑐−5←−−𝐴′
5: 𝐴*1 ‖ . . . ‖𝐴*𝑎* 𝑏−5←−−𝐴*
6: if 𝑚 = 𝑎′ = 𝑎* = 0 then
7: 𝑇 ← 𝜀
8: 𝐹 ← 𝐹A
9: for 𝑖← 1 to 𝑎′ − 1 do
10: 𝐶𝑖 ←𝑀𝑖 ⊕ 𝑍
11: 𝑍 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝑀𝑖, 𝐹AM, 𝐴′𝑖), 𝑟)
12: if 0 < 𝑎′ < 𝑚 or 0 < 𝑎′, 𝑎* then
13: 𝐶𝑎′ ←𝑀𝑎′ ⊕ left|𝑀𝑎′ | (𝑍)
14: 𝑍 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝑀𝑎′ , 𝐹AM|, 𝐴′𝑎′), 𝑟)
15: else if 0 < 𝑚 = 𝑎′ and 𝑎* = 0 then
16: 𝐶𝑎′ ←𝑀𝑎′ ⊕ left|𝑀𝑎′ | (𝑍)
17: 𝑇 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝑀𝑎′ , 𝐹AM, 𝐴′𝑎′), 𝑟)
18: 𝐹 ← 𝐹AM
19: for 𝑖← 𝑎′ + 1 to 𝑚− 1 do
20: 𝐶𝑖 ←𝑀𝑖 ⊕ 𝑍
21: 𝑍 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝑀𝑖, 𝐹M, 𝜀), 𝑟)
22: if 𝑎′ < 𝑚 then
23: 𝐶𝑚 ←𝑀𝑚 ⊕ left|𝑀𝑚| (𝑍)
24: 𝑇 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝑀𝑚, 𝐹M, 𝜀), 𝑟)
25: 𝐹 ← 𝐹M
26: for 𝑖← 1 to 𝑎* − 1 do
27: (𝐿,𝑅)← lsplit(𝐴*𝑖 , 𝑟)
28: 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝐿,𝐹A, 𝑅), 0)
29: if 𝑎* > 0 then
30: (𝐿,𝑅)← lsplit(𝐴*𝑎* , 𝑟)
31: 𝑇 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝐿,𝐹A, 𝑅), 𝑟)
32: 𝐹 ← 𝐹A
33: while |𝑇 | < 𝜏 do
34: 𝑇 ← 𝑇 ‖𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝜀, 𝐹, 𝜀), 𝑟)
35: 𝑍 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝜀, 𝐹N, 𝜀), 𝑟)
36: 𝐶 ← 𝐶1 ‖ . . . ‖ 𝐶𝑚
37: return 𝐶, left𝜏 (𝑇 )
1: Interface 𝑊.unwrap(𝐴,𝐶, 𝑇 )
2: 𝐶1 ‖ . . . ‖ 𝐶𝑚 𝑟←−𝐶
3: (𝐴′, 𝐴*)← lsplit(𝐴,𝑚(𝑐− 5))
4: 𝐴′1 ‖ . . . ‖𝐴′𝑎′ 𝑐−5←−−𝐴′
5: 𝐴*1 ‖ . . . ‖𝐴*𝑎* 𝑏−5←−−𝐴*
6: if 𝑚 = 𝑎′ = 𝑎* = 0 then
7: 𝑇 ′ ← 𝜀
8: 𝐹 ← 𝐹A
9: for 𝑖← 1 to 𝑎′ − 1 do
10: 𝑀𝑖 ← 𝐶𝑖 ⊕ 𝑍
11: 𝑍 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝑀𝑖, 𝐹AM, 𝐴′𝑖), 𝑟)
12: if 0 < 𝑎′ < 𝑚 or 0 < 𝑎′, 𝑎* then
13: 𝑀𝑎′ ← 𝐶𝑎′ ⊕ left|𝐶𝑎′ | (𝑍)
14: 𝑍 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝑀𝑎′ , 𝐹AM|, 𝐴′𝑎′), 𝑟)
15: else if 0 < 𝑚 = 𝑎′ and 𝑎* = 0 then
16: 𝑀𝑎′ ← 𝐶𝑎′ ⊕ left|𝐶𝑎′ | (𝑍)
17: 𝑇 ′ ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝑀𝑎′ , 𝐹AM, 𝐴′𝑎′), 𝑟)
18: 𝐹 ← 𝐹AM
19: for 𝑖← 𝑎′ + 1 to 𝑚− 1 do
20: 𝑀𝑖 ← 𝐶𝑖 ⊕ 𝑍
21: 𝑍 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝑀𝑖, 𝐹M, 𝜀), 𝑟)
22: if 𝑎′ < 𝑚 then
23: 𝑀𝑚 ← 𝐶𝑚 ⊕ left|𝐶𝑚| (𝑍)
24: 𝑇 ′ ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝑀𝑚, 𝐹M, 𝜀), 𝑟)
25: 𝐹 ← 𝐹M
26: for 𝑖← 1 to 𝑎* − 1 do
27: (𝐿,𝑅)← lsplit(𝐴*𝑖 , 𝑟)
28: 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝐿,𝐹A, 𝑅), 0)
29: if 𝑎* > 0 then
30: (𝐿,𝑅)← lsplit(𝐴*𝑎* , 𝑟)
31: 𝑇 ′ ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝐿,𝐹A, 𝑅), 𝑟)
32: 𝐹 ← 𝐹A
33: while |𝑇 ′| < 𝜏 do
34: 𝑇 ′ ← 𝑇 ′ ‖𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝜀, 𝐹, 𝜀), 𝑟)
35: 𝑍 ← 𝐷.dpx(𝑄(𝜀, 𝐹N, 𝜀), 𝑟)
36: 𝑀 ←𝑀1 ‖ . . . ‖𝑀𝑚
37: if 𝑇 = left𝜏 (𝑇 ′) then
38: return 𝑀
39: else
40: return ⊥
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Fig. 6: The tree of all possible frame bits sequences for a single AD-message pair (top-left). The
composition of an FKD query 𝑄𝑖 (bottom-right).
Once we extract all the blocks of 𝐴 and𝑀 , we concatenate them all in the order in which they
were extracted to obtain 𝐴 and 𝑀 . We note that the nonce is contained in the very first frame
with 𝐹1 = 𝐹N as 𝐿1 = pad𝑟(𝑁) ‖ 0. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3. Let 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑐, 𝑘, 𝑛, 𝜏 > 0 be such that 𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝑐, 𝑘 ≤ 𝑐 and 𝑛 < 𝑟. Let FSW be the
scheme of Sect. 7.2. Then,
AdvprivFSW(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁) ≤
(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑏 +
(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑐 +
𝜇𝑁
2𝑘 ,
AdvauthFSW(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁) ≤
(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑏 +
(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑐 +
𝜇𝑁
2𝑘 +
𝑞𝑣
2𝜏 .
Proof. We start by defining the 𝑅𝑂FSW—an idealized FSW that internally uses the RO𝑟FKD
instead of FKD (and thus does not use 𝑝 at all). By Thm. 5 we have that
AdvprivFSW(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁) ≤Advpriv𝑅𝑂FSW(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) +
(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑏 +
(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑐 +
𝜇𝑁
2𝑘 ,
AdvauthFSW(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁) ≤Advauth𝑅𝑂FSW(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) +
(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑏 +
(𝑞ℓ)2
2𝑐 +
𝜇𝑁
2𝑘 .
By Lem. 5, we know that a unique sequence of a nonce and AD-message pairs yields unique
sequence of RO𝑟FKD queries. We have that Adv
priv
𝑅𝑂FSW(𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) = 0. This is because the nonce
requirement implies that every 𝑅𝑂FSW.wrap(𝐴,𝑀) query is processed using an RO𝑟FKD with a
unique internal state.
We first analyse the advantage of an adversary, who only makes a single forgery attempt. In or-
der to forge, the adversary must produce a sequence of the form (𝑁, (𝐴1, 𝐶1, 𝑇1), . . . , (𝐴𝑛, 𝐶𝑛, 𝑇𝑛))
that passes the authentication check. This can either be a fresh nonce followed by only (𝐴1, 𝐶1, 𝑇1)
or 𝑁 can be reused and ((𝐶1, 𝑇1), . . . , (𝐶𝑛−1, 𝑇𝑛−1)) were obtained from a sequence of wrapping
queries (𝑁, (𝐴1,𝑀1), . . . , (𝐴𝑛−1,𝑀𝑛−1)) but (𝐶𝑛, 𝑇𝑛) was not returned by any following wrap-
ping query (𝐴𝑛,𝑀𝑛). In the former case, a fresh nonce implies that RO𝑟FKD has a fresh state when
(𝐴1, 𝐶1, 𝑇1) is unwrapped and 𝑇1 will be compared to 𝜏 random bits. The probability of a forgery
is 2−𝜏 in this case. In the latter case, all the triplets ((𝐴1, 𝐶1, 𝑇1), . . . , (𝐴𝑛−1, 𝐶𝑛−1, 𝑇𝑛−1)) are
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trivially successfully unwrapped. However freshness of (𝐴𝑛, 𝐶𝑛, 𝑇𝑛) implies that either 𝐶𝑛 or 𝐴𝑛
or 𝑇𝑛 is different from a triplet (𝐴′𝑛, 𝐶 ′𝑛, 𝑇 ′𝑛) that appeared in the experiment at the same place
(or that there has been no such triplet). If only 𝑇𝑛 ̸= 𝑇 ′𝑛, then 𝑇𝑛 cannot be correct. In any other
case, the tag 𝑇𝑛 is compared to outputs of RO𝑟FKD with a fresh internal state or fresh inputs. We
thus have Advauth𝑅𝑂FSW(1, 𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) ≤ 2−𝜏 .
To obtain a more general result for an adversary that makes up to 𝑞𝑣 verification queries, we
use a similar reduction as one used by Bellare et al. [?] and get Advauth𝑅𝑂FSW(𝑞𝑣, 𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇) ≤ 𝑞𝑣/2𝜏 . ⊓⊔
8 Discussion
Related-Key Security. Our treatment of the security of the full-state constructions is in the
traditional model where the adversary has no control over selection of the secret keys or relations
among different keys. If one considers the stronger model of related-key attack security then care
must be taken in utilizing these schemes. Indeed, if an adversary has access to two instances
𝐹1 = FKS𝑝𝐾1 and 𝐹2 = FKS
𝑝
𝐾2
, and it knows the relation 𝛥 = 𝐾1 ⊕ 𝐾2, then it can make the
outputs of 𝐹1 and 𝐹2 collide trivially by asking two 𝑏-bit queries 𝐹1(𝑀) and 𝐹2(𝑀 ⊕𝛥).
Although it is outside the scope of this paper to treat related-key security thoroughly, we
informally propose some easy solutions to prevent trivial related-key attacks like the one mentioned
before. We start by noticing that the inner-keyed Sponge construction [2] is not susceptible to this
problem, as the secret key and the adversarial data blocks never overlap; hence, a simple way
of thwarting such trivial related-key attacks is to always prepend the input data with a block of
𝑏 zeroes. Thus the adversary can no longer xor an arbitrary value directly to the key prior to
the application of the permutation. If the original adversarial resources were (𝑞, ℓ, 𝜇,𝑁), we can
without any further argumentation use the bound with the resources (𝑞, ℓ+ 1, 𝜇,𝑁) for this new
construction.
Another possibility would be to slightly modify the constructions and partition the input data
into an 𝑟-bit starting block and 𝑏-bit blocks afterward. The initial block would be xored to the
outer 𝑟 bits of the initial state. Our security analysis would carry over to this construction with
minimal modifications.
Generalized Security Model. The security analyses of FKS and FKD cover those of the
original Sponge and Duplex constructions as special cases. Beyond that, for the security analysis
of FKD itself, we have generalized the security model of the original Duplex construction from
Bertoni et al. [9,10]. While in the analysis of Bertoni et al. the analysis of the multiple-initializations
scenario is left rather implicit, we include it explicitly in our model.
This generalized setting seems more closely matching the use of the Duplex construction in
several AE schemes which do not require sessions and new session keys, where one would initialize
the Duplex (or FKD) construction for every query. This is well demonstrated by the example
of FSW. More precisely, the way we design and analyze the security of FSW allows for a very
versatile use. FSW can be used to secure AD-message pairs in a single session [12], i.e. using a
single initialize call during the lifetime of the key or alternatively every AD-message pair can be
preceded by an initialize call with a unique nonce. In fact, FSW can be used for anything between
these two extremes; for example, a setting where every AD-message pair is processed with a unique
nonce, but can get fragmented into smaller sub-pairs. The security analysis of FSW covers each
of these use cases.
On the Keying of the Sponge. As we have claimed in the introduction, the difference in
the security of the outer-keyed and inner-keyed Sponges vanishes in presence of the full state
absorption. On one hand, using a key of more than 𝑐 bits does not increase the security level, as
the extra bits cannot be used by the low-entropy Even-Mansour construction. On the other hand,
absorbing several 𝑏-bit blocks of the key only results into a derived key of effective length of 𝑐 bits.
We remark that both the outer- and inner-keyed Sponges can be seen as special cases of FKS, by
using more restrictive padding rules that only place the message blocks in the outer part of the
state.
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Boosting Sponge-based AE. Out of 57 CAESAR candidates, 10 are using a Sponge-based
design. The method we used to enhance SpongeWrap can be straightforwardly adjusted to boost
the performance of five of these 10 schemes: Keyak, Ketje, STRIBOB, CBEAM and ICEPOLE [3].
This is because all the said designs are using frame bits for domain separation. The other designs
cannot benefit from our modifications, either due to a domain separation method relying on
intangibility of the inner part of the state (NORX), or due to producing tag from the inner part of
the state (Ascon, Primates), or because they are already using the inner part of the state (Artemia)
or because the designs do not follow the general structure of the Sponge Wrap (Pi Cipher) [3]. We
note that if Ketje was to benefit from the technique we have introduced, it would be necessary to
increase the number of rounds of the underlying permutation.
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A Security of FKS and FKD with concrete online complexity
In Thms 1 and 5, we prove a bound of the advantage against FKS and FKD respectively as a
function of the maximal number of queries 𝑞, the maximal number of blocks in a single query ℓ,
the total maximal multiplicity 𝜇 and the maximal number of direct permutation queries 𝑁 . The
resources 𝑞 and ℓ are typically easy to estimate and the resulting bound gives a robust estimation
of the system’s security. However this bound overestimates the advantage of the adversary in case
that the length of the queries varies. In order to obtain a tighter bound, it is favourable to work
with total number of permutation calls induced by sponge queries rather than with ℓ.
We re-express the security of FKS and FKD as a function of 𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇,𝑁 where 𝑀 is the total
number of permutation calls induced by adversarial queries made to the Sponge or Duplex. More
precisely, we let the adversary against FKS do 𝑞 Sponge queries, such that the total number of
primitive calls made when these queries are processed is at most 𝑀 . We let the adversary against
FKD issue 𝑞 initialize() calls and at most 𝑀 duplexing() calls.
A.1 Security of FKS
We prove the following result for FKS:
Theorem 4. Let 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑐, 𝑘 > 0 be such that 𝑏 = 𝑟+𝑐 and 𝑘 ≤ 𝑐. Let FKS be the scheme of Sect. 3.1.
Then,
AdvindFKS𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇,𝑁) ≤
2𝑀2
2𝑏 +
2𝑞𝑀
2𝑐 +
𝜇𝑁
2𝑘 .
23
The first part of the proof that relies on the modular argument of [2] remains unchanged. The
analysis of FKS with secret primitive has to change to account for the different adversarial re-
sources. However, the idea of the proof carries over. We focus mainly on those parts of the proofs
that differ from the proofs in Section 5. We refer to the corresponding proofs in the said Sections
for the omitted details.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4). Consider any adversary 𝐴 with resources (𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇,𝑁). Note that
FKS𝑝𝐾 = FKS
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
0 . Therefore, by a modular argument,
AdvindFKS𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝐴) = 𝛥𝐴
(︁
FKS𝐸
𝑝
𝐾
0 , 𝑝;ROFKS, 𝑝
)︁
≤ 𝛥𝐵 (FKS𝜋0 , 𝑝;ROFKS, 𝑝) +𝛥𝐶 (𝐸𝑝𝐾 , 𝑝;𝜋, 𝑝)
= AdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝐵) +Adv
prp
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝
(𝐶)
for some adversary 𝐵 with resources (𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇) and adversary 𝐶 with resources (𝑞𝑀, 𝜇,𝑁).
In [2], it is proven thatAdvprp
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝
(𝐶) ≤ 𝜇𝑁2𝑘 for any 𝐶. In Lem. 6, we prove thatAdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝐵) ≤
2𝑀2
2𝑏 +
2𝑞𝑀
2𝑐 for any adversary 𝐵. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6. Let 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑐 > 0 be such that 𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝑐. Let FKS be the scheme of Sect. 3.1. Then,
AdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇) ≤
2𝑀2
2𝑏 +
2𝑞𝑀
2𝑐 .
Proof. We assume that the queries are already padded with an injective padding s.t. the last block
of the padded query is always non-zero and that the adversary always asks for output of length
divisible by 𝑟. For 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞, we let 𝑚𝑖 = |𝑀𝑖|/𝑏 and 𝑀𝑖 =𝑀1𝑖 ‖𝑀2𝑖 ‖ . . . ‖𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑖 s.t. |𝑀 𝑗𝑖 | = 𝑏 for
1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚𝑖 and we let 𝑧𝑖 be the number of 𝑟-bit output blocks asked by the adversary in the 𝑖th
query. We let ℓ𝑖 denote the number of permutation calls made while processing the 𝑖th query, i.e.
ℓ𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖 − 1. We define the in-states 𝑠𝑗𝑖 and the out-states 𝑡𝑗𝑖 as before (see Figure 7).
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Fig. 7: Processing the 𝑖th query.
As before, we define initial dummy out-states 𝑡0𝑖 = 0𝑏 and extended queries ?¯?𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖 ‖ 0(ℓ𝑖−𝑚𝑖)𝑏
for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞, s.t. 𝑠𝑗𝑖 = 𝑡𝑗−1𝑖 ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ𝑖. Note that the extended
queries do not necessarily have the same length any more. We group the out-states of 𝑖th query
as 𝑇𝑖 = {𝑡0𝑖 , 𝑡1𝑖 , . . . , 𝑡ℓ𝑖𝑖 }. We note that a query 𝑀𝑖 will be answered by a string 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑍1𝑖 ‖ . . . ‖𝑍𝑧𝑖𝑖
with |𝑍𝑗𝑖 | = 𝑟 for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑧𝑖 and that 𝑍𝑗𝑖 = outer
(︁
𝑡𝑚𝑖+𝑗−1𝑖
)︁
.
24
The RP-RF Switch. We switch from the random permutation 𝜋 $←− Perm (𝑏) to a random func-
tion 𝑓 $←− Func (𝑏) in the experiment. By a standard hybrid argument, we haveAdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇) ≤
AdvindFKS𝑓0 (𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇) +𝑀
2/2𝑏.
Patarin’s Coefficient-H Technique. We show that AdvindFKS𝑓0 (𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇) ≤ 𝑀
2/2𝑏 + 2𝑞𝑀/2𝑐
using the Coefficient-H technique. As before, we make use of the extended queries, noting that
the transition from 𝑀𝑖 to ?¯?𝑖 is injective and that 𝑚𝑖 of 𝑀𝑖 is still implicit from ?¯?𝑖. Again, we
will disclose the state variables 𝑇1, . . . , 𝑇𝑞 to the adversary at the end of the experiment. In the
ideal world, these are dummy variables that satisfy the same intrinsic properties of the Sponge
construction as before:
1. 𝑡0𝑖 = 0𝑏 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞,
2. if llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖, ?¯?𝑖′
)︀
= 𝑛 for 1 ≤ 𝑖, 𝑖′ ≤ 𝑞 then 𝑡𝑗𝑖 = 𝑡𝑗𝑖′ for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛,
3. outer
(︁
𝑡𝑗+𝑚𝑖−1𝑖
)︁
= 𝑍𝑗𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑧𝑖,
but are perfectly random otherwise. In both worlds, 𝑍1, . . . , 𝑍𝑞 are fully determined by 𝑇1, . . . , 𝑇𝑞,
so a transcript of adversary’s interaction with FKS will be 𝜏 = (?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑞, 𝑇1, . . . , 𝑇𝑞).
Definition of a Bad Transcript. A transcript 𝜏 is labelled as bad if
∃(𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖′, 𝑗′) ∈ {(1, 1), . . . , (1, ℓ1), (2, 1), . . . , (𝑞, ℓ𝑞)} such that:
𝑗 ̸= 𝑗′ ∨ llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖, ?¯?𝑖′
)︀
< 𝑗 = 𝑗′ ≤ min (ℓ𝑖, ℓ𝑖′) ,
𝑡𝑗−1𝑖 ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗𝑖 = 𝑡𝑗
′−1
𝑖′ ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗
′
𝑖′ .
(4)
Bounding the Ratio of Probabilities of Good Transcripts. In the ideal world, there
are exactly 𝜂(𝜏) =
∑︀𝑞
𝑖=1 ℓ𝑖 − llcp𝑏 (𝑀𝑖;𝑀1, . . . ,𝑀𝑖−1) out-states that are sampled independently
and uniformly and the remaining ones are assigned a value trivially. We thus have Pr [𝐷𝑌 = 𝜏 ] =
2−𝜂(𝜏)𝑏 for any 𝜏 .
𝛺𝑋 and comp𝑋 (𝜏) ⊆ 𝛺𝑋 being the set of all possible real-world oracles and the set of all
oracles compatible with the transcript 𝜏 respectively, we compute the probability of seeing 𝜏 in
the real world as Pr [𝐷𝑋 = 𝜏 ] = |comp𝑋 (𝜏) |/|𝛺𝑋 |.
We have that |𝛺𝑋 | = 2𝑏2𝑏 . For every 𝜏 ∈ 𝒯good, every in-state that does not trivially collide with
some other in-state must be distinct. The number of domain points of 𝑓 that have an image fixed
by 𝜏 is thus 𝜂(𝜏) =
∑︀𝑞
𝑖=1 ℓ𝑖 − llcp𝑏 (𝑀𝑖;𝑀1, . . . ,𝑀𝑖−1). We compute |comp𝑋 (𝜏) | = 2𝑏(2
𝑏−𝜂(𝜏))
and
Pr [𝐷𝑋 = 𝜏 ] =
|comp𝑋 (𝜏) |
|𝛺𝑋 | =
2𝑏(2
𝑏−𝜂(𝜏))
2𝑏2𝑏
= 2−𝜂(𝜏)𝑏 = Pr [𝐷𝑌 = 𝜏 ] .
Bounding the Probability of a Bad Transcript in the Ideal World. We again bound
the collision probability of an arbitrary but fixed pair of in-states first and then sum this probability
for all possible pairs of states. We will again associate to each in-state 𝑠𝑗𝑖 a label stamp
𝑗
𝑖 . As before,
we set stamp𝑗𝑖 = free if 1 < 𝑗 = llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
+ 1 ≤ 𝑚𝑖 such that 𝑚𝑖* < 𝑗 for some
𝑖* < 𝑖. We will set stamp1𝑖 = initial for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞 and stamp𝑗𝑖 = fixed in the remaining cases.
We use the symmetry of expression (4) to form the following equivalent statement:
∃(𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖′, 𝑗′) ∈ {(1, 1), . . . , (1, ℓ1), (2, 1), . . . , (𝑞, ℓ𝑞)} such that:
llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
< 𝑗 ≤ ℓ𝑖, 𝑠𝑗𝑖 = 𝑠𝑗
′
𝑖′ .
(5)
We again proceed by bounding the probability of collision of an arbitrary pair of in-states (𝑠𝑗𝑖 , 𝑠
𝑗′
𝑖′ ) =
(𝑡𝑗−1𝑖 ⊕?¯? 𝑗𝑖 , 𝑡𝑗
′−1
𝑖′ ⊕?¯? 𝑗
′
𝑖′ ) with stamp
𝑗
𝑖 = fixed. We fix an arbitrary 𝑖 and explore three possible cases
for the value of 𝑗, considering all possible values of (𝑖′, 𝑗′) in each case, referring to the definition
of bad transcript (5). We only list the cases very briefly; even though the cases themselves have
to change slightly (due to potentially different lengths of queries), the analysis of each case does
not change from the proof of Lem 2.
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Case 1: llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
+ 1 < 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚𝑖. The probability of the collision 𝑡𝑗−1𝑖 ⊕?¯? 𝑗𝑖 =
𝑡𝑗
′−1
𝑖′ ⊕ ?¯? 𝑗
′
𝑖′ is 2−𝑏.
Case 2: max
{︀
llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
+ 1,𝑚𝑖
}︀
< 𝑗 ≤ ℓ𝑖. The collision
𝑍𝑗−𝑚𝑖𝑖 ‖ inner
(︁
𝑡𝑗−1𝑖
)︁
= 𝑠𝑗
′
𝑖′ happens with probability 2−𝑏.
Case 3: 𝑗 = llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝑖; ?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑖−1
)︀
+ 1. There can be no collision with a twin-state 𝑠𝑗
′=𝑗
𝑖′ ,
and the collision any non-twin in-state with probability not bigger than 2−𝑏.
As there are no more than 𝑀 choices for both (𝑖, 𝑗) and (𝑖′, 𝑗′), the overall probability that the
condition (5) will be evaluated due to a pair of in-states with stamp𝑗𝑖 = fixed is at most 𝑀2/2𝑏.
If stamp𝑗𝑖 = free then the probability of a collision is 2−𝑐 by the same argument as in the
proof of Lem. 2. It can be seen that every query can have at most a single free in-state, so there
are at most 𝑞𝑀 pairs with stamp𝑗𝑖 = free and the probability of 𝜏 ∈ 𝒯bad due to such a pair is at
most 𝑞𝑀/2𝑐.
The probability of collision of a pair with stamp𝑗𝑖 = initial is 2−𝑐due to the same argument
as in the proof of Lem. 2. There is exactly one initial in-state in each query, so the overall
probability of a transcript being bad due to a pair with stamp𝑗𝑖 = initial is at most 𝑞𝑀/2𝑐. By
summing all the partial collision probabilities we obtain that Pr [𝐷𝑌 ∈ 𝒯𝑏𝑎𝑑] ≤𝑀2/2𝑏 + 2𝑞𝑀/2𝑐.
⊓⊔
A.2 Security of FKD
For FKD, we prove the following result:
Theorem 5. Let 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑐, 𝑘 > 0 be such that 𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝑐 and 𝑘 ≤ 𝑐. Let FKD be the scheme of
Sect. 3.2. Then,
AdvindFKD𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇,𝑁) ≤
𝑀2
2𝑏 +
𝑀2
2𝑐 +
𝜇𝑁
2𝑘 .
We again transform a FKD adversary into a specific FKS adversary using Lem. 3, similarly to [8,10]
and generalize the proof of Lem. 6 to these adversaries.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5). Consider any adversary 𝐴 with resources (𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇,𝑁). We have that
FKD𝑝𝐾 = FKD
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
0 . Therefore, by a modular argument,
AdvindFKD𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝(𝐴) = 𝛥𝐴
(︁
FKD𝐸
𝑝
𝐾
0 , 𝑝;ROFKD, 𝑝
)︁
≤ 𝛥𝐵 (FKD𝜋0 , 𝑝;ROFKD, 𝑝) +𝛥𝐶 (𝐸𝑝𝐾 , 𝑝;𝜋, 𝑝)
≤ AdvindFKD𝜋0 (𝐵) +Adv
sprp
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝
(𝐶)
for some adversary 𝐵 with resources (𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇) and adversary 𝐶 with resources (𝑞,𝑀, 𝜇,𝑁). Note
that 𝐵 also has access to 𝑝, but these queries are meaningless as its left oracle (FKD𝜋0 or ROFKD)
is independent of 𝑝.
In [2], it is proven that Advsprp
𝐸𝑝
𝐾
,𝑝
(𝐶) ≤ 𝜇𝑁/2𝑘. In Cor. 4 we show that any FKD adversary 𝐵
can be turned into a “constrained” adversary 𝐵′ against FKS with resources (𝑀, (𝑀2+𝑀)/2, 𝜇):
AdvindFKD𝜋0 (𝐵) ≤ Adv
ind
FKS𝜋0 (𝐵
′).
In Lem. 7, we prove that AdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝐵
′) ≤𝑀2/2𝑏 +𝑀2/2𝑐 for any such adversary 𝐵′. ⊓⊔
For the remainder of the proof, we introduce the mapping 𝑄FKS : ({0, 1}<𝑏)+ → {0, 1}*. For any
𝑏 > 0 and for all 𝑋1, . . . , 𝑋𝑛 ∈ {0, 1}<𝑏 we let
𝑄FKS(𝑋1, . . . , 𝑋𝑛) = pad𝑏(𝑋1) ‖ . . . ‖ pad𝑏(𝑋𝑛−1) ‖𝑋𝑛.
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As before, we use the result of Lem. 3 to reduce any FKD adversary 𝐴 to a constrained FKS
adversary 𝐴′ = 𝑅FKS(𝐴). To answer duplexing queries made by 𝐴, all 𝐴′ needs to do is to query
its own oracle with the image of 𝑄FKS applied to the sequence of all 𝐴’s duplexing queries made
after the last initialize call. At the end of the experiment, 𝐴 outputs whatever 𝐴′ outputs.
Corollary 4. Let 𝐴 be an adversary against FKD that makes 𝑞 initialize calls and duplexes 𝑀
in total and 𝑅FKS(𝐴) the constrained FKS adversary as defined above. It follows from Lem. 3,
that AdvindFKD𝜋0 (𝐴) ≤ Adv
ind
FKS𝜋0 (𝑅FKS(𝐴)).
We denote by 𝒜′𝑞,𝑀 the set of constrained adversaries against FKS, that were induced by some
FKD adversary that makes 𝑞 initialize calls and duplexes 𝑀 blocks in total:
𝒜′𝑞,𝑀 = {𝑅FKS(𝐴) : 𝐴 an FKD adversary with resources (𝑞,𝑀)}.
Lemma 7. Let 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑐 > 0 be such that 𝑏 = 𝑟 + 𝑐. Let FKS be the scheme of Sect. 3.1. Then,
AdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝐴
′) ≤ 𝑀
2
2𝑏 +
𝑀2
2𝑐 ,
for any constrained adversary 𝐴′ ∈ 𝒜′𝑞,𝑀
Proof. As before, we will follow the notation and conventions from the proof of Lem. 6. We assume
that every query is already padded and ends with a non-zero final 𝑏-bit block with 𝑚𝑖 being the
number of 𝑏-bit blocks in the query 𝑀𝑖.
Any adversary 𝐴′ ∈ 𝒜′𝑞,𝑀 makes exactly𝑀 FKS queries of not more than (𝑀2+𝑀)/2 blocks
in total but these queries comprise at most𝑀 unique 𝑏-bit blocks. This is because𝐴′ is induced by
an adversary 𝐴 against FKD that does not duplex more than 𝑀 blocks. In general, 𝐴 can duplex
ℓ𝑖 blocks after 𝑖th initialize() calls for any ℓ𝑖 ≥ 0 as long as
∑︀𝑞
𝑖=1 ℓ𝑖 = 𝑀 . Thus the queries of 𝐴′
follow the following structure for some ℓ1, . . . , ℓ𝑞 that meet the said constraints. Let 𝐿𝑖 =
∑︀𝑖−1
𝑗=1 ℓ𝑗 .
We have for every 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞 such that ℓ𝑖 ̸= 0:6
𝑀𝐿𝑖+1 =𝑀1𝐿𝑖+1 and 𝑀𝐿𝑖+𝑗 =𝑀𝐿𝑖+𝑗−1 ‖𝑀 𝑗𝐿𝑖+𝑗 for 2 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ𝑖
where all 𝑀 𝑗𝐿𝑖+𝑗 ∈ {0, 1}𝑏 are non-zero (due to padding). Note that we have 𝑚𝐿𝑖+𝑗 = 𝑗. For every
query, 𝐴′ asks for no more than 𝑟 output bits, so the extended queries are identical with the
original queries. The internal in-states 𝑠𝑗𝑖 and out-states 𝑡
𝑗
𝑖 are defined the same way as before.
The RP-RF Switch. We again replace the random permutation 𝜋 $←− Perm (𝑏) by a random
function 𝑓 $←− Func (𝑏) in the experiment. Although the queries made by 𝐴′ require at most (𝑀2+
𝑀)/2 calls to 𝜋 throughout the experiment, the structure of the queries implies, that there will be
at most𝑀 calls to 𝜋 with unique input. Thus the switching will contribute the term𝑀2/2𝑏 to the
final bound by a standard hybrid argument. We have AdvindFKS𝜋0 (𝐴
′) ≤ AdvindFKS𝑓0 (𝐴
′) +𝑀2/2𝑏.
Patarin’s Coefficient-H Technique. This part of the proof uses definitions and notations
form the corresponding part of the proof of Lem. 6. We will show that AdvindFKS𝑓0 (𝐴
′) ≤𝑀2/2𝑐.
The two systems an adversary is trying to distinguish are FKS𝑓0 and ROFKS. We will use the
same definition of a transcript 𝜏 = (?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑞ℓ, 𝑇1, . . . , 𝑇𝑞ℓ) where 𝑇𝐿𝑖+𝑗 holds all the 𝑗 +1 out-
states appearing due to ?¯?𝐿𝑖+𝑗 (including the dummy state 𝑡0𝐿𝑖+𝑗). We will use the same definition
of a bad transcript as in the proof of Lem. 6 (q.v. (4)). By a similar argument as in the proof of
Lem. 6, we have that Pr [𝐷𝑋 = 𝜏 ] /Pr [𝐷𝑌 = 𝜏 ] = 1 for any 𝜏 ∈ 𝒯good.
Bounding the Probability of a Bad Transcript in the Ideal World. We define the
three possible labels of in-states, free, initial and fixed in the same way as before and we will
6 If ℓ𝑖 = 0 then the FKD adversary did no duplexing queries after 𝑖th initialization and so there will be
no induced FKS queries either.
27
work with the re-expressed definition of a bad state (5). Since the definitions of free, initial
and fixed states are unchanged, the probabilities of collision due to a pair of in-states remain
unchanged as well.
For any 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞 with ℓ𝑖 ̸= 0, the query ?¯?𝐿𝑖+1 = 𝑀1𝐿𝑖+1 consists of a single block.
Thus it only induces a single in-state with stamp1𝐿𝑖+1 = initial. For any 2 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ𝑖, we
have llcp𝑏
(︀
?¯?𝐿𝑖+𝑗 , ?¯?𝐿𝑖+𝑗−1
)︀
= 𝑗 − 1, which means there is at most one new in-state 𝑠𝑗𝐿𝑖+𝑗 in-
duced by ?¯?𝐿𝑖+𝑗 and unaffected by the common prefix with previous queries. We always have
stamp𝑗𝐿𝑖+𝑗 = free.
We see that w.r.t. (5), exactly one state per query needs to be considered, giving us𝑀 states in
total. For any such state 𝑠𝑗𝑖 we need to count all other states (visited by (𝑖′, 𝑗′) in (2)) with which
it can collide. Recall that there is almost 1 state in every query that is not determined due to a
common prefix with a previous query. It suffices to look at these states when we verify if condition 5
holds for a transcript. Therefore there are at most unique𝑀 states, with which 𝑠𝑗𝑖 can collide. Using
the collision probabilities from the proof of Lem. 2, we conclude that Pr [𝐷𝑌 ∈ 𝒯𝑏𝑎𝑑] ≤𝑀2/2𝑐. ⊓⊔
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